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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With each passing day the world of mobile devices continually grows. More
and more people are using smartphones, tablets, or both as part of their daily routines.
Tasks such as checking e-mail, reading a book, 3D gaming, talking to friends, and
paying bills are only a few common uses of a mobile device. The Android operating
system is currently the most popular mobile operating system in the world. To give
an idea of how popular it is, Android devices accounted for 59.5% of all mobile devices
sold in the first quarter of 2013 which comes to around 183.7 million Android devices
sold [1].
For all the positive aspects of mobile devices there exists the threat of malware;
harmful applications that attempt to steal or delete personal information, make devices unusable, incur monetary charges for the device’s owner, among other nefarious
purposes [2]. Malware is especially prevalent on Android devices due to the broad
market share of the platform and the Android operating system design. There exists
commercial malware detecting applications for Android meant to protect users from
malware. However, as Zhou and Jiang [3] point out in their research, commercial
malware scanners do a poor job of detecting mobile malware. When 1260 malware
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applications were run through various commercial scanners, the best scanner detected
only 79.6% of the applications as malware. Many research papers and projects have
been devoted to finding better ways to detect malware on Android devices.
One particularly unique approach to detecting malware is to use performance
monitoring unit (PMU) event samples as signatures to detect malware. A PMU is part
of the central processing unit (CPU) in many modern processors. PMUs are used to
collect PMU events during the execution of an application. Examples of PMU events
are memory writes executed, instructions executed, and branch mispredictions. Once
enough samples are collected for an executing application, they can be run through
a machine learning algorithm to classify the application as malware or non-malware.
A team at Columbia University has performed initial work on such an approach and
achieved promising results at detecting malware [4].

Problem Statement The focus of this thesis is to improve the detection
accuracy of the machine learning algorithm by refining the selection of PMU events
monitored. The analysis performed as part of this thesis revealed that some of the
PMU events sampled by Demme et. al. were of limited use in distinguishing applications as malware or non-malware.

Proposed Solution This thesis proposes improving malware classification
results through sampling a variety of different PMU events not tested by Demme et.
al. [4] and by applying statistical techniques to refine the PMU events monitored. In
their previous work, only six different PMU events were used to generate their dataset.

2

One reason as to why only six PMU events were used is because the CPU, an ARM
Cortex-A9, can only monitor up to six PMU events at a time. To monitor different
PMU events separate experiments and an entirely new dataset would have to be
generated for each set of new PMU events monitored. For ARM-based processors such
as the Cortex-A9 there exist over 50 different PMU events that can be monitored [5].
This thesis focuses on performing multiple experiments with various combinations
of PMU events in order to find which events provide better malware classification
results.

3

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

In order to better understand the experimental setup and results, background
information on various aspects of the thesis need to be described. Android operating
system design, malware on Android devices, previous malware detection techniques,
performance monitoring, machine learning algorithms, and previous work overviews
are below.

2.1

Android Operating System

The Android operating system (OS) is an open-source OS developed by Google
to run on smartphones, tablets, or any other type of touchscreen device. The Android
OS architecture can be viewed in Figure 2.1. The following paragraphs explain each
level of the Android OS.

Applications The Applications level of the OS are where user-developed
applications reside. Built-in applications like the phone, calendar, and contacts list
reside in this level too. Android applications are primarily written in Java using the

4

Figure 2.1: Android OS Architecture [6]

Android Software Development Kit (SDK) but can include C/C++ code libraries
built using the Android Native Development Kit (NDK).

Application Framework The Application Framework level provides applications with access to resources in the OS. An example is that if an application would
like to access the GPS location of the device it would reference the Location Manager
in its code.

5

Libraries The Libraries level contains the main features of the OS. For example, the WebKit implementation allows web browsers to render web pages. The
libc library in the Android OS is not the same libc library on many Linux desktop
computers. The libc library on Android is a unique implementation, called Bionic,
that is smaller in size and is designed to execute on CPUs with lower clock speeds
than those of a desktop computer [7].

Android Runtime The Android Runtime level is at the same level as the
Libraries. It provides core libraries that allow developers to write Android applications in Java. The runtime contains the Dalvik Virtual Machine (VM), which behaves
similar to the Java Virtual Machine on desktop computers. The Dalvik VM does have
some key differences. The VM enables every Android application to run in its own
process and with its own instance of the Dalvik VM. The VM is specifically designed
for Android and optimized for battery-powered mobile devices with limited memory
and CPU processing power [8]. Android applications are compiled into Dalvik bytecode, which are about half the size compared to an application of similar functionality
compiled to Java VM bytecode.

Linux Kernel The Linux Kernel level is just that, a Linux kernel that contains modifications specific to Android. Modifications include but are not limited to
code for power management (wakelocks), a low-memory process killer, anonymous
shared memory (ashmem), and specialized logging. The kernel also contains the
Binder driver. Binder is the inter-process communication (IPC) protocol used when-
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ever an Android application needs to communicate with another Android application
or service [9].

Android Application Distribution Android applications are typically
published to the Google Play Store for distribution. Additionally, applications can be
installed via e-mail, near-field communication (NFC) with another Android device, or
through app stores other than the Google Play Store. Most applications downloaded
from the Google Play Store do not contain malware. On the other hand, downloading
applications from alternative app stores, specifically in Russia or China, can lead to
an infected device [10] if the user is not careful.

2.2

Android Security Model

Before Android malware exploits can be described, it is important to know how
security is enforced in the Android OS. In Android, there exists a permissions model
which requires an application to request the permissions it needs prior to installation.
Example of permissions include accessing the internet, reading a user’s contact list,
accessing location, sending text messages, among many others. These permissions are
declared as strings in the application’s manifest file [11]. See Figure 2.2 for an example
of a permission request screen. If an application attempts to use an OS resource but
has not declared the relevant permissions in the manifest file, an exception is thrown
when it attempts to use the resource. It should be noted that once installed an
application cannot request any more permissions.
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Figure 2.2: Google Maps Permissions Request Screen [12]

In addition to the permissions model, Android applications are sandboxed.
Sandboxing means the kernel assigns each Android application a unique user ID and
the OS runs each application under the assigned user ID in a separate process. This
is similar to typical Linux distributions where there can be multiple user IDs on a
system. With typical Linux distributions there can be more than one application
allowed to execute under the same user ID. With Android it is a one to one mapping
between a user ID and an application. Since sandboxing is enforced at the kernel
level, applications written in Java or native code are equally secure [12].
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When an Android application is published to an app store it is required to
be digitally signed. Android will not run an application that is not digitally signed.
The author of the application maintains a private key that is used to sign an Android
application package (APK) file. An APK file is a zip file that contains the bytecode,
application resources, digital certificate, and a manifest file that contains checksums
for each file in the APK [13]. If an individual attempts to modify the contents of the
APK, re-package the application, and attempt to install it, the checksums will not
match and the operating system will refuse to install the application.
Digitally signing an application provides others with a method of knowing
that the application did indeed come from a certain author. Android applications
are allowed to be self-signed. Put another way, application authors do not have to
sign their code using a trusted certificate from a certificate authority. This means
that when an application is first installed it is not possible to know if the author is
providing a malware or non-malware application. A user can, however, know that
subsequent updates to the application came from the original author, that is until an
exploit was found that allowed attackers to modify an application without breaking
its signature [14].

2.3

Malware Types

Android malware comes in many shapes and sizes. The research done by
the Android Malware Genome Project [3] characterized over 1260 Android malware
applications from 49 different families. Some of the Genome Project’s analysis can
be seen in the list below.
9

• 86% of malware applications were re-packaged versions of legitimate applications.
• Over 1/3 of the collection relied on root-level exploits. Once an application has
root access it can bypass all security mechanisms, therefore doing whatever it
pleases. For this reason root exploits are among the worst types of malware.
• 90% of the malware applications turn the compromised device into a botnet.
• 45% of the malware applications attempt to send text messages to a premium
number owned by the malware author. This incurs monetary charges to the
owner of the infected device. To put another way, this is similar to sending a
text message to a special number in order to donate to a charity or disaster
relief organization. These special phone numbers are premium numbers. The
malware authors create a premium number and attempt to generate as much
money as possible by infecting Android devices with malware.
• 51% of malware applications collected personal information such as user accounts and text messages.
• 83% of malware applications listened for the BOOT COMPLETED event, which is
signaled when the OS finishes booting. Many of the applications started background services once the event was signaled.
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2.4

Malware Detection Techniques

There are a variety of malware detection techniques used by commercial and
research-based malware detection software. Most commercial malware scanners depend upon static or dynamic analysis techniques to detect malware. Static analysis
scans source code or binaries to detect known malicious code signatures. Detecting
malware using static analysis becomes more difficult when malware authors obfuscate their code. Contrary to static analysis, dynamic analysis executes the malware
in a controlled environment and analyzes execution traces. Dynamic analysis is also
known as behavior-based detection [15]. Most prior work of malware detection on
Android devices uses some form of dynamic analysis.
Research from Zhou and Jiang concluded that commercial scanners are not
very good at detecting malware on Android devices [3]. They evaluated four commercial mobile malware scanners (AVG, Lookout, Norton, Trend Micro) to see how
well they detected 1260 malware applications from 49 different malware families. The
best mobile malware scanner only identified 79.6% of malware in the collection. The
worst mobile malware scanner flagged only 20.2% of the applications as malware.
In follow-on work, Jiang demonstrated that Google’s own malware detection service
identified only 15.32% of the 1260 malware applications in the collection [16].

Malware Detection Methods By Research Groups Table 2.1 lists notable malware detection methods by various researchers. Note that some techniques
do not strictly identify malware but rather enforce more strict permissions or attempt
to negate malicious activity of an application by sandboxing or some other means.
11

Table 2.1: Notable Malware Detection Methods

Isohara

Dynamic

Monitored kernel system calls for personal information

et. al. [17] Analysis

leakage, jailbreak attempts, and root privilege abuses.
Used a logging mechanism in the kernel to log all system
calls and regular expressions to detect malicious activity.

Enck
al. [18]

et. Dynamic

Developed application called TaintDroid that scans ap-

Analysis

plications in real-time in order to detect misuse of a
user’s private information. For TaintDroid to work, the
Dalvik VM was modified to label and track personal information. Evaluated 30 random non-malware Android
applications and observed 105 instances where the applications transmitted personal information. Only 37
instances were clearly legitimate and 15 of the 30 applications transmitted the user’s location to an advertising
server.
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Burguera

Dynamic

Created an application called Crowdroid that monitors

and

Analysis

kernel system calls and sends them to a centralized

Zuru-

server. The server uses a crowd-sourcing approach to

tuza [15]

collect application signatures in an anonymous manner. Malware detection was performed on the central
server in order to reduce performance overhead. Detection rates of author-created malware were good. No
real malware applications were tested due to none being
available at the time.

Shabtai

Dynamic

Created an application called Andromaly that monitors

et. al. [19] Analysis

various events (e.g., number of packets sent over Wi-Fi,
battery level) from the device, then executes a machine
learning anomaly detection algorithm to classify an application as malware or non-malware. Detection rates
of author-created malware were good, achieving a near
100% detection rate among the 5 author-created malware applications. No real malware applications were
tested due to none being available at the time of writing.
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Schmidt

Static Analy-

et. al. [20] sis

Performed static analysis by disassembling applications
to observe how system and library functions were used.
Used this data to build a non-performance intensive malware detection classifier that runs on the Android device.

Blasing

Static

and Created the Android Application Sandbox (AASand-

et. al. [21] Dynamic

box) which performed static and dynamic analysis on

Analysis

an application. The program disassembles an application and performs quick pre-checks for malicious code.
The authors then used the Android emulator running
a modified Android OS to sandbox an application and
perform dynamic analysis.
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Xu et. al.

Dynamic

Created a program called Aurasium that re-packages

[22]

Analysis

an Android application inside of a user-level sandbox.
Aurasium monitors an applications’ behavior for security and privacy violations such as retrieving user information, sending text messages to a premium number,
or access black-listed IP addresses. The authors were
able to successfully re-package, thus sandbox, all but
a small portion of their collection of applications. In
total, 99.6% of the 3491 non-malware applications and
99.8% of the 1260 malware applications were able to be
re-packaged.

Jeon
al. [23]

et.

Static Analy-

While not strictly used for malware detection, the tools

sis

developed by Jeon et. al. are used to enforce a more
fine-grained permissions model. They also created a new
service layer between Android applications and underlying service managers (e.g., location manager, phone
manager) to accept the new permissions created. The
authors found that out of 50 occurrences of the Android
permissions studied, 31 could be replaced by more finegrained permissions without affecting the user experience.
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Amos et. Dynamic

Used machine learning classifiers from the Weka [25] ma-

al. [24]

chine learning library in order to classify Android appli-

Analysis

cations as malicious. Used 1738 Android apps (1130
malicious and 408 non-malicious) for training the classifiers. The test set consisted of 47 applications (23 malicious and 24 non-malicious). Obtained 81.25% malware
detection rate using the test set. False positive rates
were mentioned in the paper as being very high. The
non-malware correct classification rate was 59.1%. Used
operating system level events such as battery level, CPU
usage, permissions, Binder properties, and more for creating feature vectors.

2.5

Performance Monitoring Unit Overview

As mentioned in the introduction, PMUs are commonplace on many modern
processors such as the ARM Cortex-A9, the processor used in the experiments of this
thesis. PMUs are dedicated hardware units in the CPU that can be used to monitor
a variety of PMU events. PMU events are also known as performance counters.
Examples of PMU events include branches mispredicted, memory read instructions
executed, and data cache misses. Typically PMUs are used to gather performance
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metrics of executing software. Because the PMU events are stored in registers inside
the CPU there is minimal overhead in using them to gather performance metrics. The
Linux kernel provides an API to read PMU events through the perf events subsystem.
This kernel subsystem is used by perf [26] and OProfile [27], two commonly used tools
to monitor PMU events. These tools were initially evaluated to gather PMU events
but had too much overhead at the desired sampling rate of every 25,000 clock cycles.
These tools were not designed to constantly sample data at a periodic rate but rather
run a program or method in its entirety, then provide metrics back the to the user. It
was for this reason a custom kernel module was used to perform PMU event sampling.
Using PMU events as malware detectors provides an tangential benefit to
mobile devices: improved battery life over other dynamic analysis malware scanners.
Having a malware scanner constantly running in the background to collect various
signatures will quickly drain the battery of a mobile device, especially if it has to
perform complex tasks to generate signatures. With the low overhead and dedicated
hardware of sampling PMU events, draining the battery becomes less of a concern.
The Nexus 7 2012 model, the device used for the experiments, contains an
NVidia Tegra3 chipset. The Tegra3 includes five Cortex-A9 processors, a graphics
processing unit (GPU), and an audio/video decoder. Each Cortex processor contains
a PMU capable of sampling PMU events [28]. Each PMU can sample up to 6 different
PMU events events at any given time [5]. For the experiments in this thesis all Cortex
CPUs sample the same 6 PMU events during a data collection session.
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2.6

Machine Learning

Machine learning is broad area of study devoted to developing applications
that learn from data. Examples of machine learning include classifying e-mails as
spam, movie recommendations systems like that found in Netflix, speech recognition,
and classifying applications as malware. The central component of machine learning
is the learning algorithm. There are many machine learning algorithms that exist.
Previous work done by Demme et. al. showed that Decision Tree and Random Forest
algorithms gave the best classification results [4]. Because they are the main two
algorithms used for classification in this thesis, an overview of each is given.

2.6.1

Decision Trees
A decision tree is a tree-like graph of decisions and their possible outcome. In

machine learning, decision trees are some of the most common and easily understood
supervised learning algorithms. A decision tree has two types of nodes: leaf nodes
and internal nodes. Leaf nodes represent a class label, also known as the output,
and are determined by the majority vote of training examples that reach the leaf in
question. Internal nodes represent a question on a feature, also known as an attribute,
and branch out according to the answers [29]. Put another way, when a classification
needs to be made for a feature vector, it starts at the root of the tree and ends at
specific leaf node depending upon the values of the feature vector.
One facet of a decision tree algorithm is pruning. Pruning is a process where
the algorithm simplifies parts of the tree in order to produce a simpler tree. Pruning
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Figure 2.3: Decision Tree Example [30]

helps to reduce overfitting by making the tree more generalized [30]. Overfitting is
where the algorithm is trained too much and produces poor results. The J48 Decision
Tree algorithm in the Weka [25] machine learning library uses a pruning technique
called subtree replacement. This is where nodes in the decision tree are replaced by
a leaf, which reduces the number of decisions along a certain path of the tree.
Figure 2.3 shows a simple decision tree that attempts to determine if a sporting
event will be played or not played based on certain weather conditions. Whether to
play or not play is the output, or label, of algorithm. Outlook, humidity, and windy
conditions are inputs, or attributes, from the dataset. The square blocks are leaf
nodes and circular blocks are internal nodes. Notice a single decision is made at
each internal node. The text inside the nodes represent the labels, or outputs. The
numbers inside each node are the number of instances in the child nodes. These
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instances originated from the training data. At the top level node there are 5 Don’t
Play instances and 9 Play instances. The leaf nodes should only have one type of
label instance.

2.6.2

Random Forests
A random forest is a collection of one or more decision trees that work together

to perform classification. Each decision tree in the random forest uses a different
subset of the training dataset to train itself [31]. In addition to each tree training on
a random subset of the training dataset, each decision tree uses a randomly selected
subset of attributes to split each node. For example, one tree may train on the
first 3 attributes in a feature vector. The second tree would train on the next three
attributes. The third tree would train on another random subset of the attributes,
and so on. Classification is performed by a voting algorithm that takes into account
the output classification of each decision tree.
Random forest classification algorithms provide a few benefits over decision
trees, with the main selling point being that random forests usually provide better
classification accuracy [32] [31]. Overfitting of the training data is much less likely
when using a random forest. Random forests are also less sensitive to outliers in
training data. One downside to random forests is that time taken to train the classifier
is increased versus the training of a single decision tree. The training time also
increases as the number of decision trees in the random forest increases.

20

2.6.3

Testing and Training
Most machine leaning algorithms must first be trained on existing data before

it can correctly classify new data.
In the case of using PMU event samples to classify malware, PMU event samples from a set of malware and non-malware applications must first be used to train
the learning algorithm. This is commonly known as the training dataset. The dataset
contains six attribute (a.k.a input or feature) columns, one for each PMU event being
sampled. Additionally the dataset contains one label (a.k.a output) column which
identifies if the sample came from a malware or non-malware application.
Once an algorithm has been trained with the training dataset it can then begin
to classify a testing dataset. The testing dataset is commonly used to evaluate how
well the classifier performs.

2.6.4

Classifier Performance
There are a few metrics that can be used for measuring a classifier’s perfor-

mance. The most obvious metric is the overall classification accuracy. Classification
accuracy is usually given as a percentage of the amount of feature vectors correctly
classified over a testing dataset. Another measurement of performance is given as
a confusion matrix. A confusion matrix contains the number of true positives, false
positives, true negatives, and false negatives in a matrix. From this matrix, other
performance metrics can be calculated. See Figure 2.4 for an example of a confusion
matrix and metrics that can be calculated from a confusion matrix. A good classifier
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TP = True Positives
FN = False Negatives

FP = False Positives
TN = True Negatives

P = TP + FP

N = FN + TN

TP Rate =

TP
P

FP Rate =

FN
N

TN Rate =

TN
N

FN Rate =

FP
P

Accuracy =

TP + TN
P +N

Figure 2.4: Confusion Matrix and Common Performance Metrics [33]

should have high true positive and true negative rates. A good classifier should have
as low false positive and false negative rates as possible. In the case of this thesis, a
true positive is when a feature vector that originated from a malware application was
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correctly classified as malware. Likewise, a true negative is when a feature vector that
originated from a non-malware application is correctly classified as non-malware.
Another popular metric of measuring classifier performance is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. An ROC curve is plotted on a two-dimensional
graph in which the true positive rate is plotted on the Y axis and the false positive
rate is plotted on the X axis. An ROC graph is used to depict the trade-offs between
true positives and false positives [33]. To make comparing ROC curves simpler, the
area under the curve (AUC) can be used as a numerical representation of the ROC
curve. The higher the AUC value, the better the classifier. See Figure 2.5 for an example of an ROC curve plot. Note that the ideal ROC curve is plotted in the figure.
The closer an actual ROC curve is to the ideal curve, the better the performance of
the classifier.
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Figure 2.5: ROC Curve Example (AUC in Parenthesis)

2.7

Dimensionality Reduction

It is common practice in machine learning to reduce the amount of dimensions
(attributes) needed to build a classifier. Reducing attributes, more commonly known
as dimensionality reduction, reduces the dataset size, therefore decreasing training
and classification time. Sometimes reducing the dimensions can improve classification
results, as some of the less salient dimensions add noise rather than provide any useful
contribution to a vector.

Attribute Selection Perhaps the simplest way to reduce dimensions is to
simply drop certain dimensions from the dataset. The difficult part is determining
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which attributes are the least salient and can be dropped from the dataset without
significantly reducing the classification rate. One approach, as is the case in the
Waffles machine learning library [34], is to normalize all values and then train a
logistic regression model to predict the output label. The attribute that is assigned
the smallest weight from the training is then dropped from the data. The process is
then repeated, therefore ranking attributes from most to least salient.

2.8

Previous Related Work: Detecting Malware With PMU Events

This thesis is based of the work by Demme et. al. at Columbia University.
In their work Demme et. al. used a Texas Instruments PandaBoard running a
custom version of Android from Linaro. The PandaBoard contains a dual-core ARM
Cortex-A9 processor. They chose the following six PMU events to monitor for their
dataset [35]:

• Memory-reading instructions executed
• Memory-writing instructions executed
• Software changes of PC
• Immediate branches executed
• Unaligned accesses executed
• Branches predicted

In their paper no mention was given as to why these six PMU events were
chosen for the dataset or that any other PMU events were tested. In fact, the belief
is held that the focus of the previous work was not to determine the PMU events that
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provided the best classification accuracy but rather prove that PMU samples could
be used to classify an application as malware or non-malware.

PMU Event Salience From this thesis’ initial experiments on a subset of
the dataset from Demme et. al. [4] it was discovered that dropping up to three (out of
six total) of the least salient attributes had very minimal impact on classification accuracy. In the experiment, 117,54 malware vectors and 135,752 non-malware vectors
were used for the training set. The vectors were created by summing the raw PMU
samples between context switches together. The testing set consisted of 1009 malware
vectors and 224 non-malware vectors. The Waffles machine learning library [34] was
used to perform training and classification. The Decision Tree and K-Nearest Neighbor algorithms were used for classification. See Figure 2.6 for the complete results.
As it turns out, reducing the dataset to use the four most salient attributes increased
the accuracy of the classifier. The most to least salient events according to Waffles
are as follows: Memory-reading instructions executed, memory-writing instructions
executed, software changes of PC, immediate branches executed, unaligned accesses
executed, and branches predicted.
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Figure 2.6: Dimensionality Reduction Analysis on Subset of Columbia Dataset

Detection Results The research performed by Demme et. al. show that
PMU events can be used to classify malware with good results. 530 malware (from
37 malware families) and 210 non-malware applications were used in the experiment.
These applications were then split into testing and training sets. Classification was
done at the context switch, thread, and application level. Thread level classification
attempts to classify a running thread ID as malicious or non-malicious. Application
level classification attempts to classify an entire running process as malicious or nonmalicious by using samples from any of the owning process’s threads.
Context switch classification results were not presented in the paper. For
thread classification an ROC AUC value of 82.3% was achieved. For application-level
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classification, and ROC AUC value of 83.1% was achieved. Both of these results
allowed for a 10% or less false positive rate [4].
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CHAPTER 3

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

3.1

Overview

The overall experiment can be broken into four phases: data collection, data
preparation, classification, and evaluation. Data collection involves collecting the
PMU samples from the device and storing the data for later use. Data preparation
involves the filtering and aggregating of the PMU samples into a dataset used by
the classifier. Next, classification is performed by a machine learning algorithm to
determine if an application is malware or non-malware. Finally, the classifier is evaluated for accuracy and other testing techniques such as salience testing are performed.
The following sections describe the hardware and software used and each of the four
phases in more detail.

3.2

Hardware and Software Used

The Nexus 7, 2012 model [36], was used to collect PMU samples. It was
selected because of its ability to easily modify and load a custom version of the
Android operating system. The Nexus 7, at the time of purchase, was cheaper and
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easier to find that other official Google devices such as the Nexus 4 and Nexus 10.
See Table 3.1 for specific software version information used in the experiments.
In addition to the Nexus 7 a desktop computer running a Ubuntu Linux 12.10
virtual machine was used to build the kernel, Android operating system, and PMU
Reader application. The classification and data aggregation was performed on a
Windows 7 desktop computer.

Table 3.1: Android Version Information For Experiments

Android Version 4.2.1

Targeting the android-4.2.1 r1 branch from the Android Open Source Project.

Linux Kernel 3.1

The grouper kernel was used from the Android Open
Source Project [37]. This kernel is based off version
3.1 of the Linux kernel. The term grouper is code
name for the Nexus 7. The build configuration used
was tegra3 android defconfig.
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Android Build Target

The build target and build type for experimentation

and Build Type

was the Nexus 7 engineering build full grouper-eng.
There exist two other build types: user and userdebug. The user build type is for production usage while
the userdebug build type is similar but has root access
and additional debug tools [38]. The eng build type is
for development purposes and contains additional tools
such as perf [26] and OProfile [27]. It was for this reason
the eng build type was used for experimentation.

Android NDK Rev. 8e

The Android NDK [39] was used compile code that reads
from the kernel module buffer and sends PMU samples
over a network. Revision 8e was used to build the code.

Android API Level 16

The Android API level 16 [40] was targeted for the PMU
reader application. Version 16 maps to Android version
4.1 which means the application will run on any Android
device with version 4.1 or higher.

Waffles

Machine

Learning Library

The Waffles machine learning library [34] was used to
perform classification of the Android applications. Waffles provides a set of command-line tools to train and
test various machine learning algorithms. Version 201304-06 was used.
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Weka 3.6.9

The Weka machine learning software [25], version 3.6.9,
was used to manipulate datasets and perform additional
classification. Weka provides a graphical user interface
(GUI) in addition to command-line tools to manipulate
datasets and build classifiers.

3.3

Data Collection

Data collection was performed by a group of different applications and a kernel
module. First, a kernel module is used to collect the PMU events and copy them
to user-space via a character device. Secondly an Android service reads from the
character device and sends the PMU samples via a TCP socket. Finally, a TCP
server application on a desktop computer receives the samples and stores them in a
file.

3.3.1

PMU Sampler Kernel Module
The PMU sampler kernel module is based off of the PMU Sync Sampler code

from Columbia University’s Computer Architecture and Securities Technology Lab
(CASTL) GitHub site [41]. The existing code provided the ability to synchronously
sample PMU events every N CPU cycles, where N is a value that is user configurable.
PMU events are also user configurable. The PMU events and sample period are con-
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figured via the Sysfs interface [42] as is starting and stopping of the PMU sampling.
For example, to set the period of the PMU sampler module to 25000 cycles the command echo "25000" > /sys/sync_pmu/period can be issued via the shell. Similar
commands are available that configure each PMU event register to be sampled and to
start and stop the sampling of the PMU events. PMU samples are written to a buffer
that is made available to user-space programs via a character device. The PMU samples can be retrieved in user-space by opening a file stream on the /dev/pmu_samples
character device.
Modifications had to be made to the existing kernel module because it was
designed to work with a Texas Instruments (TI) OMAP4460 developer board, also
known as a PandaBoard. The device-specific code was isolated to a single file, meaning that adding support for the Tegra3 chipset means replacing a single source code
file. However, adding support for a Tegra3 device proved more difficult than originally thought because of the Tegra3’s CPU power management features. The Tegra3
chipset contains five Cortex-A9 CPUs. One of the CPUs, known as the companion
core, is operating system transparent and runs tasks at low frequency when in active
standby mode [43]. The other four CPUs are visible to the operating system. All
cores are enabled or disabled based upon the work load of the device. See Figure 3.1
for examples of tasks that require various CPU workloads. For this reason, logic that
monitors when a CPU comes online or goes offline was needed. When a CPU comes
online, the interrupt request affinity is set to the particular CPU and the PMU hardware is enabled. When a CPU is about to go offline the PMU hardware is disabled
and no more interrupts will occur. See Section A.1 for the source code file.
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Figure 3.1: Tegra3 CPU Core Activation Based on Workload [43]

Other minor modifications had to be made in order for the module to work
with an Android kernel from the AOSP repository, namely the initialization and
cleanup of the character device. Because there is no mknod support in the Android
kernel a more involved setup process was needed that did not require the use of this
command.
Sampling that occurs every set number of clock cycles is handled by PMU
interrupt requests that occur when the cycle count register overflows. There exists
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four PMU interrupt requests, one for each CPU. Each PMU contains a cycle count
register that stores the number of cycles that have occurred. When this register
overflows an interrupt request is generated. The kernel module is setup to listen and
handle these types of fast interrupts. When the interrupt occurs, a method is called
in the kernel module to disable the PMU, gather samples and place them into the
buffer, reset the cycle count register and overflow flags, and re-enable the PMU. The
interrupt handler method is called on the CPU in which the interrupt originated.
Alternative approaches were evaluated to periodic sampling of PMU events
such as hi-res timers [44]. After some experimentation it was observed that PMU
interrupts provided a more accurate and precise way to sample PMU events on a
periodic basis.
One major issue discovered was that when an interrupt request occurs the
interrupt handler method in the kernel module was always called on CPU0. This
meant that only PMU samples could be gathered from CPU0 even if the interrupt came from another CPU. To remedy this the kernel provides a method in
arch/arm/include/asm/pmu.h to set IRQ affinity for all cores that are active. The
problem still remained even after calling this method because there is no guarantee
all CPUs will be online when the kernel module is initialized. To further complicate
the issue, interrupt request affinity is reset to CPU0 when the CPU goes offline. The
ultimate fix to this issue required a kernel modification that added a new method to
pmu.h. This new method allows for setting the CPU affinity on a single PMU. This
new method is called when a CPU comes online, thereby setting the interrupt request
affinity to the correct CPU and fixing the issue.
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Sample Output Format The PMU sampler module outputs binary samples to user space through a character device interface. A buffer struct is allocated
for each CPU. This struct contains the CPU number, number of samples collected,
an array of sample structs, and a pointer to the next buffer. Once a buffer becomes
full it is added to the end of a linked list of buffers. This linked list is made available
to user space through the character device interface. The sample struct contains the
cycle count of when the PMU events were gathered. It also contains the process ID
of the currently executing process. Finally the sample struct contains an array of the
PMU event samples. See Section A.1 for the buffer and sample struct source code.

3.3.2

Android PMU Sender Service
An Android service is used to configure and read from the character device

output of the kernel module. The service sends the PMU samples over a TCP socket
to a computer for further processing. An Android application with a user interface
was originally considered to perform these tasks. Implementing the functionality as a
service is the recommended way to perform long-running tasks in Android [45]. Services are also less likely to be terminated by the low-memory watcher of the Android
operating system as opposed a typical Android application with a user interface.
The service was mostly written in C and C++ code and compiled using the
Android NDK [39]. Writing the service logic in C and C++ provides performance
benefits and is easier to interface with character devices. In addition to these benefits
there was existing code from the PMU Sync Sample repository [41] that was adapted
to compile and run as an Android service.
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When the service is instantiated it looks for specific input parameters. These
parameters are used to configure the kernel module and the socket on which the PMU
samples will be sent. Thee exact list is below.
• Sampling period (in clock cycles)
• PMU event 1
• PMU event 2
• PMU event 3
• PMU event 4
• PMU event 5
• PMU event 6
• IP address of the TCP server
• Port number on which to send the PMU samples

Sending data over Wi-Fi versus writing to a file It was decided to send
the PMU samples via a TCP socket as they are collected versus writing the samples
to a file on the Nexus 7. Since the Nexus 7 does not have an Ethernet port the data
is sent via Wi-Fi. There are many advantages to sending the data as it is sampled
versus logging to a file and retrieving the log files at a later time. First, time is saved
because the step of copying very large log files is not needed. Second, the log files
can take up large amounts of space, therefore reducing the amount of applications
that can be loaded on the device. Finally, Android devices are designed to send and
receive data over Wi-Fi in an efficient and performance-conscience manner.
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Figure 3.2: Collecting and Aggregating Data

3.4

Data Preparation

The TCP Server program was written to collect the raw PMU samples and
write them to a file. The program was written in C and runs as a console application.
Once the server is closed, thus ending the collection of data, another program splits
the single binary file into multiple binary files. Each file represents a running thread
ID on the device and contains the PMU samples that originated from the thread ID.
Another file is created that maps each file name to a more user-friendly process name.
The Splitter program was written in C++ as a console application and was based
on a modified version of code from the PMU Sync Sampler GitHub [41] site. See
Figure 3.2 for a visual overview of the collection of data.
It should be noted that the Splitter application was modified to ignore PMU
data that originated from the kernel. It was decided to ignore kernel PMU events
because there is no meaningful way to determine what user-space process (if any)
caused the kernel to perform a certain action. Put another way, there is no good
way to determine if PMU samples from the kernel are the results of malicious or
non-malicious behavior.
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Context switches need special mention as they become important when it
comes time to perform classification. A context switch, in terms of this thesis, is
defined as when the process ID of the most current PMU sample vector differs from
the process ID of the previous PMU sample vector. When a context switch is observed,
the splitter application inserts a PMU sample vector with zeroes for all the values.

PMU Samples Filter and Combiner A C# console application, PMU
Samples Filter and Combiner, was written to filter and combine sample files from multiple data gathering sessions. If the sample files originated from malware applications
the console applications will filter out any sample files that are from non-malware
applications. This is needed because even though malware applications are being
executed during the experiment there are non-malware applications and services that
run in the background. The sample files collected from different sessions are then
copied into a new directory, hence combining multiple sessions of PMU sample files
into a single directory. Because multiple sessions exist there is a possibility that there
are duplicate thread IDs from the sample files. For this reason each PMU sample
file is given a unique file ID by the console application. The console application also
renames the PMU sample files based on a command-line parameter. Depending upon
the type of PMU data collected the files will be renamed into one of the following
four formats:

• ham train {File ID}.bin
• malware train {File ID}.bin
• ham test {File ID}.bin
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• malware test {File ID}.bin
The text ’ham’ is used to indicate non-malware. The text {File ID} is a
numerical value indicating the new ID of the sample file. The following example helps
further describe what the console application does. Lets say a non-malware training
run was completed. It took 5 sessions to collect all the PMU samples for the nonmalware training set. The PMU sample files were run through the console application.
The console application renames the first file encountered to ham train 1.bin, the
second to ham train 2.bin, and so on until all files are enumerated.

Figure 3.3: Combining Data From Multiple Sessions

PMU Samples Parser Once the files are filtered and combined into a single
directory, they are ready to be turned into a dataset for testing or training. A C#
console application was created called the PMU Samples Parser that generates a
dataset file from the PMU sample files. The PMU Samples Parser reads all PMU
sample files in a directory when generating a dataset. For this reason both the
malware and non-malware PMU sample files must be copied into the same directory
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for the parser application to generate a dataset that includes samples from both
malware and non-malware applications.
The generated dataset is in the Attribute Relation File Format (ARFF) [46].
ARFF is the preferred dataset format for both Weka [25] and Waffles [34] machine
learning libraries. It is a text-based format that includes data descriptions for the
attributes and labels. The actual data is comma separated with each line in the file
representing a feature vector.
The PMU Samples Parser has the ability to aggregate the PMU sample vectors
together. Aggregating the raw data helps reduce noise, dataset size, and time spent
training and testing a classifier. An experiment was initially performed on using raw
PMU samples to perform classification. The results had low accuracy and contained
many false positives. Demme et. al. [4] also confirm this. The PMU Samples Parser
allows raw PMU sample vectors to be aggregated by the following methods:

• Summing the PMU samples together between context switches
• Averaging the PMU samples together between context switches
• Summing the PMU samples together between context switches and adding an
additional attribute that includes the number of samples aggregated
• Averaging the PMU samples together between context switches and adding an
additional attribute that includes the number of samples aggregated
• Creating histograms on a set number of PMU samples. Context switches are
ignored.
• Creating histograms on a set number of PMU samples between context switches.
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With summing between context switches, each attribute is summed together
between context switches. Context switches are indicated by all zeroes for a raw
sample vector. See Figure 3.4 for a visual representation of summing between context
switches. The vectors on the left indicate raw PMU samples. The vector on the right
is the feature vector generated from the summed values. Note that for this figure
example it is assumed the raw samples came from a malware application, hence the
malware label.

Figure 3.4: Example of Raw PMU Samples Summed Together Between Context
Switches for a Known Malware Application

With histograms, a set number of raw samples are read and a histogram is
created for each PMU event. The number of bins in the histogram is configurable.
This allows for large feature vectors to be created. For example, imagine the application was configured with 32 samples as the interval size with a bin count of 8.
The application will read in 32 samples and create a histogram for each PMU event.
Six histograms will be created. The feature vector that is generated will contain the
minimum value, maximum value, amount of items in each bin, and the bin size for
each histogram. With a interval size of 32 samples and 8 bins, a feature vector with
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66 attributes will be generated. See Figure 3.5 for an example of a histogram with 8
bins and a bin size of 20.

Figure 3.5: Example of 8-Bin Histogram With Bin Size of 20

The PMU Samples Parser can also include the process name and file ID information for each feature vector when generating the dataset. This is essential
for thread-based classification on a test dataset, as this information allows for the
mapping between the application and thread in which the feature vector originated.
Process name and file ID are ignored during context-switch classification. The PMU
Samples Parser source code can be viewed in Section A.2.
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Figure 3.6: Training the Classifier

3.5

Classification

Once a training dataset is created it is then used to train a machine learning
algorithm. The Weka [25] machine learning library was used perform testing and
training of aggregated PMU feature vectors. Once trained, the machine learning library outputs the trained algorithm to a file. See Figure 3.6 for a visual representation
of how an algorithm is trained.
The algorithm file is then used to perform classification on a testing dataset.
Context switch level aggregation results are then displayed. Figure 3.7 shows how
context switch level classification is performed.
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Figure 3.7: Context Switch Level Classification

Thread Classifier For thread-based classification, the machine learning library outputs the predicted results of each feature vector in the testing dataset into
an ARFF file. The predicted output file is then merged with the testing dataset using
the Weka [25] merge dataset functionality.
The merged ARFF dataset file is input into the Thread Classifier. The Thread
Classifier is a C# application that parses the dataset file and builds a mapping
from the feature vectors to each file ID. The Thread Classifier contains logic that
determines if a thread is malware or non-malware. A thread is determined to be
malware if a threshold percentage of feature vectors are classified as malware. See
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Figure 3.8 for a visual representation of the thread classification process. Consult
Section A.3 for the thread classification source code.

Figure 3.8: Thread-Based Classification

3.6

3.6.1

Evaluation

Classification Results Evaluation
Once classification has been performed for all three classification techniques,

the results are evaluated. For each technique, overall classification accuracy and
the true positive rate for malware are the properties of most importance. The false
positive rate is also important, as any good classifier should have a low false positive
rate. See Section 2.6.4 for more information about performance metrics of classifiers.

3.6.2

Salience Testing
Salience testing is performed to determine which PMU events were the most

salient from each experiment. Salience, in this usage, can be defined as a value that
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is the most prominent contributor to the classification result. Put another way, if
the most salient attribute of a dataset was removed the classification accuracy would
drop significantly. The goal of salience testing is to pick the most salient attribute
or attributes from different experiments and aggregate them into new a experiment.
By selecting the most salient attributes (PMU events in this case) to be collected,
classification accuracy should increase although this is not guaranteed. In many
cases, good classification accuracy is the result of the combination of attributes. If
this combination is no longer part of a feature vector then classification accuracy
could decrease as opposed to increase.
Salience testing, also known as attribute selection, was done using the attributeselector command in the Waffles [34] and Weka [25] machine learning libraries.
Attribute selection in Waffles involves normalizing all the values in the dataset, then
training a logistic regression model to predict the output of a feature vector. The
attribute that was assigned the smallest weight value is then dropped from the data.
The process is then repeated until only one attribute remains. Once complete, the
command displays the attributes from most salient to least salient. Attribute selection in Weka can be done in a few ways. For this thesis the InfoGainAttrbiuteEval
ranking filter was applied to the attributes. It uses a different ranking algorithm than
the Waffles library and thus could output different results.
It should be noted that salience testing is a technique used for determining
which attributes are the most important for a given dataset. Salience testing cannot
compare the salience of attributes belonging to different datasets. For this reason
there is no cut and dry formula for determining if an attribute belonging to one
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dataset is more or less important to an attribute belonging to another dataset. The
selection of attributes must be determined through a combination of salience testing,
performance of prior experiments, and trial and error.
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CHAPTER 4

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

4.1

Overview

Collecting the PMU samples were done on a Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit machine. As
mentioned before a Nexus 7, 2012 model [36], was used to collect PMU samples. The
PMU sampler kernel module was configured to sample PMU events at an interval of
every 25000 clock cycles. This clock cycle count was chosen because Demme et. al.
use the same values and achieved good classification results with minimal performance
overhead [4]. During collection of the data the Nexus 7 was given internet access via
Wi-Fi. One goal of the experiments was to mimic how a malware application would
behave in the wild which meant the device should have internet access. Many malware
applications establish connections to a remote server in order to receive payloads
and/or commands. Allowing internet access would make the malware behave just as
if it is in the wild.
Collection of PMU samples was performed by a research assistant, not the
author of the thesis, so as to not potentially bias or skew the experiments. The
research assistant was given a detailed checklist of the applications that needed to
be executed during an experiment. The research assistant would then execute the
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scripts necessary to get the device in a state to collect PMU samples, then execute the
applications listed in the checklist. The research assistant was not given any special
instruction as to how the applications were to be executed. This was by design. The
intent was to have the researcher behave like a typical user of a mobile device in order
to generate real-world samples.
Due to the fact that only 6 PMU events can be monitored at any given time,
multiple experiment runs were conducted. Each run contained a different set of PMU
events. Each run was split into four sub-groups: malware for training, malware for
testing, non-malware for training, non-malware for testing. Splitting applications
into four groups, as opposed to two groups, made splitting the test and training data
simpler when performing aggregation and classification of the feature vectors. It is
easier to label PMU samples as originating from malware or non-malware applications
when they are split into separate groups. With each sub-run, a particular group of
applications is executed.

4.2

Applications Tested

This section lists the applications used in the experiments. It should be noted
that malware applications are grouped by malware family, not by application name.
Due to the large amount of malware apps used and that some of the application titles
are not in English, grouping the apps by malware family made the most sense.

Non-Malware Applications Popular non-malware applications were selected from the Google Play Store [47] or came bundled with the operating system.
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Only a handful of non-malware applications were selected. This was because the
Android operating system runs many background processes, all performing various
tasks. These background processes are considered part of the non-malware application group. Another reason for the low non-malware application count is because
most non-malware applications are much more complex than malware applications.
For this reason more samples are generated from non-malware applications than malware applications. For this research, re-packaged good applications that contain a
malicious payload are considered malicious in their entirety.
The applications chosen were a mix of games, internet-based applications such
as CNN or YouTube, and popular information-providing applications such as Google
Maps or Zillow. Some applications appear in both the testing and training list by
design. A goal is to try and detect different executions of the same application. Even
if a user ran an application on two separate occasions and performed the exact same
actions both times the PMU samples generated would be slightly different. See table
Table 4.1 for the list of applications used.

Table 4.1: Non-Malware Applications Used In Experiments

Training Set

Testing Set

Angry Birds

Angry Birds Rio

Calendar

Angry Birds Space

CNN App

eBay

Google Maps

Google Maps
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Sudoku Free

IMDB

Target Shopping App

Solitaire

Temple Run

Sudoku Free

The Weather Channel

Temple Run 2

YouTube

USA Today

Zillow

The Weather Channel
Zillow

Malware Applications There are 80 total malware applications used in
the experiments. The applications come from 14 different families of malware. Since
some malware tends to stick around even after uninstalling the application, it is
necessary to flash the Nexus 7 with a clean image of the Android operating system
between malware collections from different malware families. This research assumes
that applications belonging to the same malware family attempt to deliver the same
malicious payload. Therefore, it is not necessary to flash the device between executing
malware applications from the same family. As an example, imagine the device was
loaded with five applications belonging to the AnserverBot malware family. All five
applications can be executed and PMU samples collected without having to flash the
device after each application is executed. Once finished collecting samples, the device
would be flashed before installing the next family of malware applications.

52

For each malware family, the applications were split as follows: One-third of
the applications were used for training while the remainder were used for testing. For
families with only one application the same application was used for both the training
and testing set. Table 4.2 lists the malware families and the application counts. For
descriptions of each malware family see Appendix B.
The malware applications came from two sources. The first source is from
the Android Malware Genome Project [48], which is the collection of applications
used in research by Zhou and Jiang [3]. The malware applications were collected by
researchers diligently asking for samples from commercial anti-malware companies or
by actively crawling existing Android marketplaces for known malware. The second
source of malware applications is Contagio Minidump [49], a site where various people can upload applications infected with malware. Contagio contains more recent
malware applications and is constantly being updated with new malware samples.
Because of Contagio’s open acceptance policy, there is a small chance that some
applications uploaded do not actually contain malware. Due to the crowd-sourcing
and open policy of the site, applications incorrectly uploaded as malware are usually
removed quickly by the maintainers of the site.

Table 4.2: Malware Families Application Counts

Family Name

Android.Steek

Total Applica- Training

Testing Set

tion Count

Set Count

Count

7

2

5
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Table 4.2: Malware Families Application Counts

Family Name

Total Applica- Training

Testing Set

tion Count

Set Count

Count

Anserverbot

16

5

11

CoinPirate

1*

1

1

CruseWind

1*

1

1

DroidDreamLight

8

3

5

DroidKungFu4

9

3

6

FakeAngry

1*

1

1

GoldDream

8

3

5

Gone60

7

2

5

Jifake

1*

1

1

LoveTrap

1*

1

1

Plankton

10

4

6

RogueSPPush

9

3

6

Zitmo

1*

1

1

Total

80

31
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* Same application was used in testing and training sets.

54

4.3

Selection of PMU Events

As mentioned in prior sections there are over 50 PMU events that can be chosen
to be monitored for an ARM Cortex-A9 processor. Some events were eliminated from
testing because, according to their descriptions in the ARM Cortex-A9 reference
manual [5], they do not provide information about executing code. Other events were
eliminated after testing proved they do not provide useful samples for classification.
The following tables outline the PMU events that were deemed not useful for the task
at hand.

Table 4.3: PMU Events Not Tested

Event Name

Reason Ruled Out

Software increment

According to the reference manual, ”The register is incremented only on writes to the Software Increment Register. [5]” The software increment register is part of the
PMU and not directly related to executing code.

Cycle Count

Incremented every CPU cycle. Does not provide relevant information on executing code. The cycle count
can be retrieved from its own register and should not be
included as an event to be monitored.
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Floating-point

in-

structions

Only has non-zero values if an application does floatingpoint arithmetic. From initial experiments most applications do not use floating-point arithmetic or it is used
infrequently. Most malware does not perform floatingpoint arithmetic.

Table 4.4: PMU Events Ruled Out Via Testing

Event Names

Reason Ruled Out

ISB instructions

Returned zero or very close to zero with each

Write context ID

sample.

Exception taken
Exception return
STREX failed
NEON instructions
Processor stalls because of PLDs
Processor stalled because of DMB
External interrupts
DMB instructions
Data Engine clock enabled
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Table 4.4: PMU Events Ruled Out Via Testing

Event Names

Reason Ruled Out

Memory-reading instructions executed

Events are not supported for the version of

Procedure return executed

the Cortex-A9 found in the Tegra3 chipset.

Java bytecodes executed
Software Java bytecodes executed
Jazelle backward branches executed
PLE cache line request completed
PLE cache line request skipped
PLE FIFO flush
PLE request completed
PLE FIFO overflow
PLE request programmed
Instruction cache dependent stall cycles These events monitor the amount of CPU cyData cache dependent stall cycles

cles counts that have occurred. Since cycle

Main TLB miss stall cycles

counts can vary based on CPU load it was

Issue does not dispatch any instruction hypothesized that events related to storing
Issue is empty

cycle counts would vary too much to provide
good classification results. The observations
in Section 5.3.1.2 confirms this.
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4.4

The Experiments

Even though the PMU events to monitor were reduced through the efforts
described in Section 4.3, there are 30 PMU events remaining that could provide useful
information when it comes to classifying an application as malware or non-malware.
Since only 6 PMU events can be monitored at a time, 5 different experiments were
created to monitor various PMU events. The experiments’ PMU event values are
listed in the preceding tables. Note the Event ID corresponds to the PMU event
identifier listed in the Cortex-A9 reference manual [5].

Table 4.5: Experiment 1 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x06

Data reads

0x07

Data writes

0x0C

Software changes of the PC

0x0D

Immediate branches

0x0F

Unaligned load or stores

0x12

Predictable branches
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Table 4.6: Experiment 2 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x10

Branch mispredicted or not predicted

0x02

Instruction micro TLB misses

0x04

Data cache accesses

0x6E

Predictable function returns

0x01

Instruction cache misses

0x03

Data cache misses

Table 4.7: Experiment 3 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x05

Data micro TLB misses

0x63

STREX passed

0x65

Data evictions

0x91

DSB instructions

0x50

Coherent linefill misses

0x51

Coherent linefill hits
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Table 4.8: Experiment 4 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x66

Issue does not dispatch any instruction

0x67

Issue is empty

0x68

Instructions coming out of the
core renaming stage

0x70

Main execution unit instructions

0x71

Second execution unit instructions

0x72

Load/store instructions

Table 4.9: Experiment 5 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x81

Processor stalled because of a
write to memory
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0x82

Processor stalled because of instruction side main TLB miss

0x83

Processor stalled because of data
side main TLB miss

0x84

Processor stalled because of instruction micro TLB miss

0x85

Processor stalled because of data
micro TLB miss

0x8A

4.5

Integer clock enabled

Aggregation Techniques

Three different techniques of aggregation were performed for each experiment:
summing events between context switches, creating histograms on fixed sample intervals between context switches, and thread-based aggregation. The thread-based
aggregation is at a more coarse level and depends upon the classification results from
the context switch level.

Context Switch Level Aggregation When performing context switch
level aggregation (e.g. summing between context switches, histograms), certain preprocessing steps and re-training are conducted in order to improve classification results. The exact steps, performed with Weka [25], are listed as follows:
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1. Balance the training dataset to a near-equal distribution of malware and nonmalware samples using the Resample filter.
2. Create a Decision Tree (J48 algorithm in Weka) classifier from the balanced
dataset.
3. Run the training dataset through the classifier and remove and attributes that
were not classified correctly using the RemoveMisclassified filter.
4. Train a new classifier using the updated training set that does not contain the
incorrectly classified feature vectors.
5. Run the test dataset through the classifier and save the prediction values to a
new dataset using the AddClassification filter.
6. Repeat steps 2 through 5 using the Random Forest classifier.

The listing above applies to both summing events between context switches
and creating histograms of fixed intervals between context switches. However, a preprocessing step that removes outliers and extreme values from the training dataset was
done for the summing events between context switches technique. Initial tests shown
that this pre-processing step improves classification results. Outliers and extreme
values were discovered by using Weka’s InterquartileRange filter [25].

Thread Level Aggregation As mentioned before, thread-based aggregation depends upon context-switch level classification predictions but marks whether
or not an entire thread is considered malware or non-malware. The thread-based aggregation, being at a higher level, displays metrics about how many malware threads
were correctly and incorrectly identified for each malware family. Other metrics in62

clude the amount of non-malware threads identified correctly and incorrectly as well
as average malware family classification accuracy. Average malware family classification accuracy is computed by averaging the classification accuracy values for each
malware family.
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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

5.1

Initial Experimentation

Initial experimentation was performed on the datasets generated by Experiments 1 through 5 to determine which aggregation technique provides the best classification results. It was observed that creating histograms from fixed PMU sample
intervals between context switches gave the best classification results at the context
switch level. Table 5.1 shows some of the testing results using various aggregation
techniques on Experiment 2. Other experiments provided similar patterns of results.
Note that a high true positive rate for malware is desired in addition to a high overall
classification accuracy.
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Table 5.1: Results of Histogram Testing Techniques on Experiment 2

Aggregation Type

Algorithm

Sample Inter-

Classification

Malware

val Size / Bin

Accuracy

Positive Rate

Size
Histograms

ignoring J48 Decision

context switches

True

Non-Malware
True
Rate

32 / 8

78.8%

0.629

0.894

32 / 8

78.6%

0.662

0.884

128 / 16

75.5%

0.657

0.857

N/A

71.9%

0.659

0.734

Tree
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Histograms

between J48 Decision

context switches
Histograms

Tree

between J48 Decision

context switches

Tree

Summing

J48 Decision

between
switches

attributes
context

Tree

Positive

Among the summing or averaging techniques described in Section 3.4, summing the attributes between context switches gave the best results. Averaging the
results gave lower classification accuracy, most likely because this technique reduces
the uniqueness of each feature vector. Put another way, two completely different
groups of samples between context switches, when averaged, could have the same values for each attribute. Had summing been used the two feature vectors would differ.
Similarly, adding another dimension to the feature vector that contains the number
of samples aggregated between the context switch did not provide any better results.
Because another dimension was added, classification times took longer.

5.2

Salience Testing

Salience testing was performed on Experiments 1 through 5 in order to determine which PMU events were the most salient from each experiment. Testing was
conducted as described in Section 3.6.2. The training and testing datasets were combined into a single dataset for each experiment. The combined dataset was used for
salience testing. A driving factor behind using the combined dataset is that the more
feature vectors that can be run through the salience tests the better. The combined
dataset, in theory, should provide a better overall picture of what attributes are the
most salient.

Results Table 5.2 displays the salience testing results for Experiments 1
through 5 using both Waffles [34] and Weka [25] machine learning libraries. From
these results, two new experiments were crafted that combine the most salient at-
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tributes (in varying combinations) from Experiments 1, 2 and 3. No PMU events
from Experiments 4 or 5 were chosen because of the poor classification results described in section Section 5.3.1.2. See Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 for PMU events chosen
for Experiments 6 and 7, respectively.
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Table 5.2: Salience Testing Results for Experiments 1 to 5

Experiment

Most Salient

...

...

...

...

Least Salient

Memory Writes

Unaligned

PC Change

Memory Reads

Immediate

Unpredicted

Branch

Branch

Memory Reads

Unaligned

Number - Source
1 - Waffles

Access
1 - Weka

PC Change

Unpredicted

Memory Writes

Immediate
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Branch
2 - Waffles

Data

Cache

Misses

Branch

Access

Predictable

Instruction

Data Cache

Instruction

Branch

Function

TLB Misses

Accesses

Cache Misses

Mispredicts

Branch

Instruction

Mispredicts

Cache Misses

Returns
2 - Weka

Instruction

Data Cache

Data

TLB Misses

Accesses

Misses

Cache Predictable
Function
Returns

Table 5.2: Salience Testing Results for Experiments 1 to 5

Experiment

Most Salient

...

...

...

...

Least Salient

Coherent

STREX Passed

Data Eviction

Data

DSB

Coherent

TLB Miss

Instructions

Linefill Hit

DSB

Coherent

STREX Passed

Number - Source
3 - Waffles

Linefill Miss
3 - Weka

Coherent

Data Eviction

Data

Micro

Micro
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4 - Waffles

Linefill Miss

TLB Miss

Instructions

Linefill Hit

Issue Dispatch Issue Empty

Instructions

Main

Load / Store Second Execu-

No Instructions

Core

Execution Unit

Instructions

Name

Stage
4 - Weka

Instructions

tion Unit
Instructions

Instructions

Load / Store Main

Exe- Second Execu-

Issue Dispatch Issue Empty

Core

Instructions

Unit tion Unit

No Instructions

Stage

Name

cution

Instructions

Instructions

Table 5.2: Salience Testing Results for Experiments 1 to 5

Experiment

Most Salient

...

...

...

...

Least Salient

Integer

Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall

Number - Source
5 - Waffles

Clock

Enabled

Instruction

Memory Write

TLB Miss

Data

Micro

TLB Miss

Data Side TLB Instruction MiMiss

cro TLB Miss
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5 - Weka

Integer
Enabled

Clock

Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall Processor Stall
Data

Micro

TLB Miss

Instruction Mi- Memory Write

Data Side TLB Instruction

cro TLB Miss

Miss

TLB Miss

Table 5.3: Experiment 6 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x06

Data reads

0x07

Data writes

0x0C

Software changes of the PC

0x03

Data cache misses

0x6E

Predictable function returns

0x02

Instruction micro TLB misses

Table 5.4: Experiment 7 PMU Events

Event ID

Event Name

0x06

Data reads

0x0C

Software changes of the PC

0x02

Instruction micro TLB misses

0x03

Data cache miss

0x50

Coherent linefill misses

0x65

Data evictions
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5.3

Experiments 1 - 7

This section contains the results of the three various classification techniques
described in Section 4.5. For information about the classification metrics used in the
following tables and figures, consult Section 2.6.4.

5.3.1
5.3.1.1

Context Switch Summing Classification Results
Individual Experiment Results
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Table 5.5: Experiment 1 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
63.2%
0.723
69.0%
0.581

Train Set Size 363700
Malware Samples 181922
Non-Malware Samples 181778

TN Rate FP Rate
0.606
0.394
0.722
0.278

FN Rate
0.277
0.419

Test Set Size 799916
Malware Samples 180643
Non-Malware Samples 619273

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

130610

50033

Non-Malware

243993

375280

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

104875

75768

Non-Malware

172339

446934
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ROC Area
0.677
0.742

Table 5.6: Experiment 2 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
71.9%
0.659
76.2%
0.611

Train Set Size 248941
Malware Samples 124372
Non-Malware Samples 124569

TN Rate FP Rate
0.734
0.266
0.801
0.199

FN Rate
0.341
0.389

Test Set Size 499903
Malware Samples 103161
Non-Malware Samples 369742

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

67943

35218

105390

291352

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

63064

40097

Non-Malware

78849

317893
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ROC Area
0.701
0.809

Table 5.7: Experiment 3 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
66.3%
0.717
69.1%
0.563

Train Set Size 270410
Malware Samples 135231
Non-Malware Samples 135179

TN Rate FP Rate
0.636
0.245
0.755
0.245

FN Rate
0.283
0.437

Test Set Size 332482
Malware Samples 141170
Non-Malware Samples 282312

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

101199

39971

Non-Malware

102682

179630

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

79517

61653

Non-Malware

69087

213225
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ROC Area
0.691
0.745

Table 5.8: Experiment 4 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
66.2%
0.585
70.5%
0.699

Train Set Size 255931
Malware Samples 128120
Non-Malware Samples 127811

TN Rate FP Rate
0.701
0.299
0.709
0.291

FN Rate
0.415
0.301

Test Set Size 372347
Malware Samples 123076
Non-Malware Samples 249271

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

72041

51035

Non-Malware

74597

174674

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

85976

37100

Non-Malware

72616

176655
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ROC Area
0.674
0.777

Table 5.9: Experiment 5 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
64.4%
0.718
67.5%
0.658

Train Set Size 268580
Malware Samples 134568
Non-Malware Samples 134012

TN Rate FP Rate
0.607
0.393
0.684
0.316

FN Rate
0.282
0.342

Test Set Size 451877
Malware Samples 150023
Non-Malware Samples 301854

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

107656

42367

Non-Malware

118664

183190

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

98697

51326

Non-Malware

95380

206474
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ROC Area
0.675
0.731

Table 5.10: Experiment 6 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
69.7%
0.777
71.1%
0.598

Train Set Size 323149
Malware Samples 161562
Non-Malware Samples 161587

TN Rate FP Rate
0.656
0.344
0.768
0.232

FN Rate
0.223
0.402

Test Set Size 338985
Malware Samples 113796
Non-Malware Samples 225189

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

88413

25383

Non-Malware

77353

147836

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

68104

45692

Non-Malware

52234

172955
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ROC Area
0.736
0.773

Table 5.11: Experiment 7 Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
66.8%
0.614
71.2%
0.692

Train Set Size 338768
Malware Samples 169200
Non-Malware Samples 169568

TN Rate FP Rate
0.695
0.305
0.722
0.278

FN Rate
0.386
0.308

Test Set Size 407891
Malware Samples 133673
Non-Malware Samples 274218

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

82036

51637

Non-Malware

83757

190461

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

92525

41148

Non-Malware

76308

197910
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ROC Area
0.648
0.775

5.3.1.2

Grouped Results and Observations

The figures in this section display grouped classifier performance metrics to
make comparisons simpler. From these figures a few observations can be made. First,
the Random Forest classifier produced better overall accuracy and true negative rates
for each experiment compared to the Decision Tree. However, true positive rates were
slightly worse for the Random Forest classifier in most cases. Experiment 2 using a
Random Forest had the highest overall classification accuracy of 76.2% and highest
true negative rate of 80.1%. Experiment 6 using a Decision Tree had the best true
positive rate of 77.7%. Experiments 4 and 5 had poor true positive rates and may
not be good at detecting samples originating from malware.
The overall results of summing PMU samples between context switches produced fair, but not great, classification results. This can partially be explained due to
the fact that the notion of time is lost when the samples are aggregated together. By
losing this facet of the data, results can suffer. Creating histograms between context
switches should allow the time component to be kept when performing classification.
Overall training time for the classifiers, running through the steps described
in Section 4.5, took around two hours each. Running each classifier on the testing
dataset took less than five seconds for each experiment.
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Figure 5.1: Decision Tree Results for Summing Between Context Switches
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Figure 5.2: Random Forest Results for Summing Between Context Switches
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Figure 5.3: ROC Curves for Random Forest Algorithm (AUC in Parenthesis)

5.3.2

Histograms Between Context Switches Classification Results

5.3.2.1

Individual Experiment Results

Table 5.12: Experiment 1 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
73.8%
0.663
76.7%
0.715

Train Set Size 645707
Malware Samples 323240
Non-Malware Samples 322467

TN Rate FP Rate
0.789
0.211
0.802
0.198

FN Rate
0.337
0.285

Test Set Size 1106153
Malware Samples 446014
Non-Malware Samples 660139

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

295631

150383

Non-Malware

139209

520930

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

318936

127078

Non-Malware

130458

529681
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ROC Area
0.742
0.847

Table 5.13: Experiment 2 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
77.0%
0.643
81.2%
0.694

Train Set Size 413860
Malware Samples 206525
Non-Malware Samples 207335

TN Rate FP Rate
0.871
0.129
0.905
0.095

FN Rate
0.357
0.306

Test Set Size 567388
Malware Samples 250299
Non-Malware Samples 317089

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

160970

89329

41002

276087

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

173793

76506

30115

286974

85

ROC Area
0.782
0.893

Table 5.14: Experiment 3 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
78.0%
0.770
81.2%
0.811

Train Set Size 415344
Malware Samples 207424
Non-Malware Samples 207920

TN Rate FP Rate
0.794
0.206
0.815
0.185

FN Rate
0.230
0.189

Test Set Size 589704
Malware Samples 360832
Non-Malware Samples 228872

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

278016

82816

47132

181740

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

292629

68203

42453

186419
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ROC Area
0.805
0.898

Table 5.15: Experiment 4 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
72.7%
0.667
76.3%
0.709

Train Set Size 424209
Malware Samples 211763
Non-Malware Samples 212446

TN Rate FP Rate
0.813
0.187
0.839
0.161

FN Rate
0.333
0.291

Test Set Size 516648
Malware Samples 303187
Non-Malware Samples 213461

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

202156

101031

39952

173509

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

215108

88079

34374

179087
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ROC Area
0.755
0.855

Table 5.16: Experiment 5 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
74.8%
0.711
79.0%
0.769

Train Set Size 460596
Malware Samples 230376
Non-Malware Samples 230220

TN Rate FP Rate
0.794
0.206
0.817
0.183

FN Rate
0.289
0.231

Test Set Size 676957
Malware Samples 377692
Non-Malware Samples 299265

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

268708

108984

61627

237638

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

290334

87358

54711

244554

88

ROC Area
0.782
0.877

Table 5.17: Experiment 6 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
72.5%
0.669
76.7%
0.718

Train Set Size 530369
Malware Samples 264859
Non-Malware Samples 265510

TN Rate FP Rate
0.808
0.192
0.84
0.160

FN Rate
0.331
0.282

Test Set Size 457708
Malware Samples 274210
Non-Malware Samples 183498

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

183459

90751

35172

148326

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

196892

77318

29424

154074
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ROC Area
0.760
0.870

Table 5.18: Experiment 7 Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
73.1%
0.679
77.2%
0.720

Train Set Size 531602
Malware Samples 265952
Non-Malware Samples 265650

TN Rate FP Rate
0.802
0.198
0.843
0.157

FN Rate
0.321
0.28

Test Set Size 579882
Malware Samples 333200
Non-Malware Samples 246682

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

226227

106973

48760

197922

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

239995

93205

38797

207885
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ROC Area
0.770
0.871

5.3.2.2

Grouped Results and Observations

The following figures display grouped classifier performance metrics to make
comparisons simpler. As can be observed from the figures, the classification performance (overall accuracy, TP rate, TN rate) is better for histograms than the the
technique of summing between context switches in Section 5.3.1.2. With the histogram aggregation technique, the Random Forest classifiers outperform the Decision
Tree classifiers in all areas. The best overall results came from Experiment 3 while
using a Random Forest classifier. Overall accuracy, true positive rate, and true negative rate were all above 80.0%. Experiment 2 using a Random Forest classifier had
a 90.5% true negative rate, meaning the combination of PMU events in Experiment
2 is very good at classifying non-malware.
Overall training time for the classifiers, running through the steps described
in Section 4.5, took around five to eight hours each. Running each classifier on the
testing dataset took less than ten seconds for each experiment.
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Figure 5.4: Decision Tree Results for Histograms
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Figure 5.5: Random Forest Results for Histograms
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Figure 5.6: ROC Curves for Random Forest Algorithm (AUC in Parenthesis)

5.3.3

Thread Classification
For thread-based aggregation, the histogram-based results using the Random

Forest algorithm were fed into the Thread Classifier application. A thread is classified
as malware if 33% or more of the feature vectors belonging to a thread are classified
as malware. After testing various methods of thread classification, from a scoring
algorithm to various threshold levels, the threshold level of 33% was chosen because
it provided the best classification results without high false negative rates of 80% or
more.

5.3.3.1

Individual Experiment Results
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Table 5.19: Experiment 1 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Threads
Classified
as Malware
46
14
419
100
3
70
26
1
22
1
35
4
3
20

DroidKungFu4
58
Android.Steek
20
CoinPirate
703
AnserverBot
130
FakeAngry
4
RogueSPPush
114
GoldDream
33
CruseWin
4
DroidDreamLight 27
Zitmo
2
Gone60
41
Jifake
4
LoveTrap
3
Plankton
24
Average Classification Accuracy

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
79.3%
70.0%
59.6%
76.9%
75.0%
61.4%
78.8%
25.0%
81.5%
50.0%
85.4%
100.0%
100.0%
83.3%
73.3%

283
52

84.5%
15.5%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
87
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 296

22.7%
77.3%
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Table 5.20: Experiment 2 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Threads
Classified
as Malware
6
52
8
3
18
24
4
23
31
4
0
26
56
1

Android.Steek
22
AnserverBot
86
CoinPirate
13
CruseWin
3
DroidDreamLight 26
DroidKungFu4
39
FakeAngry
5
GoldDream
39
Gone60
41
Jifake
4
LoveTrap
5
Plankton
37
RogueSPPush
92
Zitmo
2
Average Classification Accuracy

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
27.3%
60.5%
61.5%
100.0%
69.2%
61.5%
80.0%
59.0%
75.6%
100.0%
0.0%
70.3%
60.9%
50.0%
62.6%

180 62.5%
108 37.5%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
105 39.0%
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 164 61.0%
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Table 5.21: Experiment 3 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Threads
Classified
as Malware
14
93
6
3
22
45
4
29
33
9
5
24
54
1

Android.Steek
22
AnserverBot
141
CoinPirate
12
CruseWin
6
DroidDreamLight 30
DroidKungFu4
63
FakeAngry
6
GoldDream
44
Gone60
49
Jifake
9
LoveTrap
5
Plankton
37
RogueSPPush
79
Zitmo
6
Average Classification Accuracy

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
63.6%
66.0%
50.0%
50.0%
73.3%
71.4%
66.7%
65.9%
67.4%
100.0%
100.0%
64.9%
68.4%
16.7%
66.0%

258 71.7%
102 28.3%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
66
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 218
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23.2%
76.8%

Table 5.22: Experiment 4 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Threads
Classified
as Malware
28
105
10
2
26
45
3
27
49
7
2
27
54
3

Android.Steek
36
AnserverBot
139
CoinPirate
11
CruseWin
5
DroidDreamLight 33
DroidKungFu4
61
FakeAngry
5
GoldDream
40
Gone60
54
Jifake
7
LoveTrap
5
Plankton
39
RogueSPPush
83
Zitmo
3
Average Classification Accuracy

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
77.8%
75.5%
90.9%
40.0%
78.8%
73.8%
60.0%
67.5%
90.7%
100.0%
40.0%
69.2%
65.1%
100.0%
73.5%

294
71

80.6%
19.4%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
69
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 205

25.2%
74.8%
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Table 5.23: Experiment 5 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Android.Steek
43
AnserverBot
178
CoinPirate
13
CruseWin
11
DroidDreamLight 28
DroidKungFu4
47
FakeAngry
7
GoldDream
56
Gone60
58
Jifake
9
LoveTrap
7
Plankton
29
RogueSPPush
130
Zitmo
8
Average Classification Accuracy

Threads
Classified
as Malware
38
152
12
11
27
42
7
50
55
9
6
25
110
5

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
88.4%
85.4%
92.3%
100.0%
96.4%
89.7%
100.0%
89.3%
94.8%
100.0%
85.7%
86.2%
84.6%
62.5%
89.6%

397
28

93.4%
6.6%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
22
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 254

8.0%
92.0%
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Table 5.24: Experiment 6 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Android.Steek
42
AnserverBot
141
CoinPirate
14
CruseWin
6
DroidDreamLight 37
DroidKungFu4
52
FakeAngry
8
GoldDream
39
Gone60
48
Jifake
8
LoveTrap
5
Plankton
33
RogueSPPush
106
Zitmo
8
Average Classification Accuracy

Threads
Classified
as Malware
31
109
6
3
30
38
2
34
21
8
4
23
80
5

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
73.8%
77.3%
42.9%
50.0%
81.1%
73.1%
25.0%
87.2%
43.8%
100.0%
80.0%
69.7%
75.5%
62.5%
67.3%

296
88

77.1%
22.9%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
63
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 205

23.5%
76.5%
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Table 5.25: Experiment 7 Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Android.Steek
39
AnserverBot
153
CoinPirate
12
CruseWin
7
DroidDreamLight 48
DroidKungFu4
57
FakeAngry
4
GoldDream
65
Gone60
56
Jifake
14
LoveTrap
7
Plankton
37
RogueSPPush
136
Zitmo
8
Average Classification Accuracy

Threads
Classified
as Malware
33
131
8
3
36
42
3
61
51
14
7
36
110
7

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
84.6%
85.6%
66.7%
42.9%
75.0%
73.7%
75.0%
93.9%
91.1%
100.0%
100.0%
97.3%
80.9%
87.5%
82.4%

393
49

88.9%
11.1%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
81
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 233

25.8%
74.2%
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5.3.3.2

Grouped Results and Observations

The grouped results for thread-based classification can be seen in Figure 5.7.
As can be observed, the percentage of malware threads correctly classified as malware
are high, with some results over 85%. However, note that the Thread Classifier application classified many non-malware threads as malware, negating the usefulness of
thread-based classification as it is currently implemented. Experiment 5 classified the
most malware threads correctly, with 93.4% threads classified correctly. Experiment
5 also incorrectly classified the most non-malware threads as malware, with only 8.0%
of non-malware threads identified as non-malware. Experiment 7 had the best overall
results, with a 88.9% of malware threads and 25.8% of non-malware threads correctly
classified, respectively. The poor misclassification rates for non-malware threads is
likely due to the simple nature of how the Thread Classifier application classifies a
thread as malware or non-malware.
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Figure 5.7: Thread Classification Results

5.4

Big Experiment Results

The final experiment, also known as the Big Experiment, was performed in
order to test classification on a larger testing and training dataset. The PMU events
for this experiment were chosen based on the classification results from Experiments
1-7. According to the observations in Section 5.3.2.2, the PMU events from Experiment 3 were selected for the Big Experiment because they gave the best balanced
classification results for both malware and non-malware.
More non-malware applications were used in the training of the malware in
addition to the already existing non-malware applications listed in Table 4.1. See
Table 5.26 for the list of additional non-malware applications. More malware applications were also added to the testing and training sets in addition to those in
Table 4.2. The additional malware application counts can be viewed in Table 5.27.

Table 5.26: Additional Non-Malware Applications Used In Big Experiment

Angry Birds Star Wars II

Pet Rescue Saga

Bible

Photo Grid

Clean Master

ScoreCenter

Coin Dozer

Shazam

Deer Hunter 2014

Snapchat

Dumb Ways To Die

Subway Surf

Google Earth

Tetris

Fruit Ninja

Twitter
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iHeartRadio

Word Search

Jackpot Bingo

Zedge

Minion Rush

Table 5.27: Additional Malware Families Application Counts

Family Name

Total Applica- Training

Testing Set

tion Count

Set Count

Count

Android.Steek

7

7

0

AnserverBot

37

13

24

DroidDreamLight

16

16

0

DroidKungFu3

14

10

4

DroidKungFu4

11

11

0

GoldDream

21

21

0

YHZC

8

3

5

Total

114

81

33

Total Including

194

112

88

Existing
Applications

106

5.4.1

Classification Results

Table 5.28: Big Experiment Context Switch Summing Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
66.6%
0.758
66.1%
0.585

Train Set Size 1038292
Malware Samples 519647
Non-Malware Samples 518645

TN Rate FP Rate
0.597
0.403
0.719
0.281

FN Rate
0.242
0.415

Test Set Size 493248
Malware Samples 210936
Non-Malware Samples 282312

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

159979

50957

Non-Malware

113732

168580

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

123363

87573

79378

202934
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ROC Area
0.698
0.739

Table 5.29: Big Experiment Histogram Classification Results

Algorithm
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Accuracy TP Rate
79.1%
0.802
83.0%
0.853

Train Set Size 1448695
Malware Samples 724856
Non-Malware Samples 723839

TN Rate FP Rate
0.765
0.235
0.775
0.225

FN Rate
0.198
0.147

Test Set Size 767104
Malware Samples 538232
Non-Malware Samples 228872

Decision Tree Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

431550

106682

53712

175160

Random Forest Confusion Matrix
Predicted Value
Malware
Non-Malware
Actual
Value

Malware

Non-Malware

459151

79081

51600

177272
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ROC Area
0.804
0.894

Table 5.30: Big Experiment Thread Classification Results
Malware
Family

Total Threads

Android.Steek
22
AnserverBot
836
CoinPirate
12
CruseWin
6
DroidDreamLight 30
DroidKungFu3
42
DroidKungFu4
63
FakeAngry
6
GoldDream
44
Gone60
49
Jifake
9
LoveTrap
5
Plankton
37
RogueSPPush
79
YZHC
15
Zitmo
6
Average Classification Accuracy

Threads
Classified
as Malware
21
674
12
6
27
38
46
3
32
36
8
5
31
58
10
4

Correctly Identified Malware Threads
Incorrectly Identified Malware Threads

Classification
Accuracy
95.4%
80.6%
100.0%
100.0%
90.0%
90.5%
73.0%
50.0%
72.7%
73.5%
88.9%
100.0%
83.8%
73.4%
66.7%
66.7%
81.6%

697 82.5%
148 17.5%

Correctly Identified Non-Malware Threads
25
Incorrectly Identified Non-Malware Threads 259
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8.8%
91.2%

5.4.2

Observations
Compared to Experiment 3, better classification results were achieved for the

histogram aggregation technique when using the Random Forest algorithm. Overall
accuracy improved from 81.5% to 83.0%. True positive rate rose from 81.1% to 85.3%.
True negative rate dropped to 77.5% in the Big Experiment, compared to 81.2% for
Experiment 3.
Summing between context switches produced slightly worse results for the Big
Experiment. This could be because of the large size of the training dataset for the Big
Experiment. As the training set size increases there are more chances for a feature
vector to be identical or near-identical to another feature vector when the vectors
are generated by summing raw samples between context switches. This can pose a
problem when building a classifier, especially when two or more vectors are nearidentical but their actual classification differs (i.e., one vector came from malware,
the other from non-malware).
Malware thread classification improved for the Big Experiment when compared
to Experiment 3. The correctly identified malware threads rose from 71.7% to 82.5%.
However, correctly identified non-malware threads dropped from 23.2% to 8.8%.
Overall training time for the classifiers, running through the steps described
in Section 4.5, took around 18 to 32 hours each due to the large amount of data in
the training set. Running each classifier on the entire testing dataset took less than
ten seconds. It should be noted that running the classifier for a single application’s
samples would take less than a second.
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5.5

Performance Versus Prior Work

This section compares the results of the research by Demme et al. [4] with the
results of this thesis. Demme et. al. performed context switch level classification and
thread-based classification in their work. The results of context switch level classification (e.g., summing between context switches, histograms) are not stated in their
paper and thus no direct comparisons can be made with this thesis’ context switch
level classification results. The best thread classification results obtained by Demme
et. al. were 82.3% ROC AUC using a decision tree. With their thread classifier
93.3% of threads were correctly identified as malware. It should be noted that 83.0%
of the total malware threads originated from one malware family, AnserverBot. With
this family removed from the results, thread classification drops to 77.0%. This result
comes with another caveat, as the full testing dataset was not used. The good results
were achieved with a testing set devoid of the netd application. A majority of the full
testing set’s data came from the netd network application, in which their classifier
was very good at detecting. With netd excluded from the testing set the AUC was
lower. No exact number was given as to the new AUC value, only an ROC curve.
Before comparing results, it should be noted of a few differences between the
results of Demme et. al. and this thesis. This thesis used smaller testing and
training datasets during the experiments. The amount of malware families was also
smaller for this thesis (14 vs. 37). The histogram aggregation technique as well as
thread classification was performed differently by this thesis because the histogram
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aggregation technique and thread classification were not described in enough detail
by Demme et. al to reproduce.
The dataset in this thesis did not filter out netd or any other samples from the
testing dataset. Malware threads identified correctly were comparable to the results
achieved by Demme et. al., ranging from 62.5% for the lowest and 93.4% for the
highest experiment in this thesis.
Another noteworthy comparison is how well this thesis’ histogram aggregation
technique performed against the results of thread classification by Demme et. al.
Using a Random Forest classifier on the Big Experiment, the ROC AUC was 89.4%.
The AUC achieved by Demme et. al. was 82.3%.

5.6

Performance Versus Commercial Scanners

Another important comparison is how well the thread classification performed
compared to commercial scanners. The research by Zhou and Jiang [3] ran four
commercial Android malware scanners against 1260 malware applications. Results
were grouped by malware family. Table 5.31 compares the Big Experiment threadlevel classification accuracy against the malware detection results of Lookout 6.9.
Lookout was chosen from the four commercial scanners because it had the highest
overall detection accuracy. The Android.Steek and FakeAngry malware families were
not part of the malware application dataset used by Zhou and Jiang, hence why they
do not appear in the table. As can be observed in Table 5.31, the thread classification
accuracy from the Big Experiment performed better overall than that of Lookout.
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Table 5.31: Big Experiment Thread Classification Accuracy Versus Lookout 6.9
Detection Rates
Malware
Family

Big
Experiment Lookout
Classification
Version 6.9
Accuracy
Detection
Results [3]
AnserverBot
80.6%
47.5%
CoinPirate
100.0%
0.0%
CruseWin
100.0%
100.0%
DroidDreamLight 90.0%
97.8%
DroidKungFu3
90.5%
99.3%
DroidKungFu4
73.0%
100.0%
GoldDream
72.7%
85.1%
Gone60
73.5%
100.0%
Jifake
88.9%
100.0%
LoveTrap
100.0%
100.0%
Plankton
83.8%
0.0%
RogueSPPush
73.4%
33.3%
YZHC
66.7%
4.5%
Zitmo
66.7%
100.0%
Average
82.8%
69.1%
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1

Summary

This thesis sought to discover better PMU events to use for detecting malware
on the Android operating system. The results indicate that there are combinations of
PMU events that perform better at classifying samples as originating from malware or
non-malware. The aggregation technique of summing values between context switches
did not provide great results for any experiment, especially when compared to the
histogram aggregation technique. Experiment 3 had the best classification rates for
both malware and non-malware when using the histogram aggregation technique. The
Big Experiment confirmed that as the training set size increases, classification results
increase or stay similar when using histograms as the aggregation technique. With
the Big Experiment, the best true positive rate of 85.3% was achieved. Experiment
7 performed best for thread-based classification.
This thesis has contributed to the field of Android malware research in the
following ways:

114

• The research by Demme et. al. [4] was confirmed in that PMU events can be
used to detect malware. Furthermore, the work presented in this thesis was
performed using a consumer Nexus 7 Android device running an unmodified
version of the Android operating system, not a development board running
a custom Linaro Android operating system as with Demme et al. The only
changes required of the PMU event logging system are a kernel module and
very minor modification to the underlying Linux kernel.
• Through salience testing it was observed that the PMU events in Experiment 2
and Experiment 3 performed the best at classifying samples as malware at the
context switch level. For thread-based classification Experiment 7 provided the
most balanced results between the number of malware threads and non-malware
threads identified correctly.
• The dataset of the raw PMU samples generated by the experiments in itself
is a big contribution to this area of research. It is a goal to make the dataset
publicly available so that researchers from universities or organizations can use
it to further the research of malware detection using PMU events. The entire
dataset contains over 30 gigabytes of raw PMU samples from various PMU
events.

6.2

Future Work

Improving Classification Results The next major step of this research
is to improve the classification results through a variety of means. First, and most
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obvious, is to increase the amount of samples used for training the classifier. Bringing
in more malware families and more malware apps for each family should help to improve classification results. Another future task is to improve the Thread Classifier ’s
algorithm for classifying a thread as malware or non-malware.
Another task to improve results would be to incorporate multiple classifiers
into the entire classification scheme. Each classifier could be trained to detect certain
types of malware. The samples would be fed to all classifiers which then output the
prediction results into a voting algorithm. The voting algorithm would determine if
the application in question is malware or non-malware.
Using the PMU events along with other Android operating system-level statistics could improve classification results. Statistics such as processor load, battery
usage, Binder-specific properties, and a slew of other statistics could be coupled with
the PMU events to create large feature vectors for classification. This helps negate
the major downside to using PMU events for classification: There is a small number
(six in our case) of PMU events that can be monitored at any given time.
Another way to potentially improve results would be to create malware classifiers for each family of malware. With this approach, a classifier would be trained to
detect malware from a certain malware family. Consequently, multiple classifiers, one
for each malware family, would be used in predicting the label. A voting algorithm
would make a decision based on the outputs of the classifiers as to whether a feature
vector is malicious or non-malicious.
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On-Device Classification The major goal of future work is to put the
classifier on the device and feed samples to the classifier in real-time. The classifier
would determine if running applications are malware or not and alert the user if an
application is suspect.
If the classifier is to go on the device it would need to be efficient. If the
classifier had to run all the time collecting samples (thus using valuable CPU cycles)
the battery would quickly drain on a mobile device. The negate performance issues
the classifier could take advantage of the GPU. The classification algorithm could be
tailored to run on the GPU of the mobile device, reducing the time the algorithm
takes to execute and reducing power consumption. Although support for GPU computing on mobile devices is limited at the time of this writing, there are plans for
future mobile chipsets to support general purpose GPU computing libraries. Specifically, NVidia has announced that their Tegra5 chipset will support the CUDA GPU
computing library [50].

Testing With Android Phones Since Android phones typically contain
more personal information than tablets, more malware is targeted towards phones.
For this reason, one facet of future work is to perform experimentation on an actual
Android phone. Zhou and Jiang’s [3] research discovered that a large portion of
malware is used to send text messages to premium rate numbers. As tablets do not
have built-in SMS text capabilities, malware could behave differently when on a tablet
versus on a phone. It would be important for future work to verify the classification
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results achieved while using an Android tablet are mirrored or improved when an
Android phone is used.

118

APPENDICES

119

APPENDIX A

SOURCE CODE

A.1

Kernel Module Sampler Code

This section lists kernel module source code useful to understanding how the
module works.
Code A.1: Tegra3 Device Source File
// arm.c
/*
* Methods for handling PMU sampling and IRQs for a Tegra3 chipset.
* This file contains the logic needed to successfully sample
* PMU events from a Tegra3 based device such as the Nexus 7.
*/
#include "pmu_api.h"
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<linux/interrupt.h>
<linux/platform_device.h>
<linux/irq_work.h>
<linux/cpumask.h>
<linux/cpu.h>
<asm/uaccess.h>
<../mach-tegra/include/mach/irqs.h>
<asm/io.h>
<../include/asm/pmu.h>

#include "v7_pmu.h"
unsigned long num_ctrs = 6;
#define INT_CPU0 INT_CPU0_PMU_INTR
#define INT_CPU1 INT_CPU1_PMU_INTR
#define INT_CPU2 INT_CPU2_PMU_INTR
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#define INT_CPU3 INT_CPU3_PMU_INTR
callback cpuOnlineCallback;
// Event handler for when a PMU cycle count overflow interrupt occurs
// on one of the CPU cores.
static irqreturn_t sample_handle_irq(int irqnum, void* dev)
{
unsigned int flags;
if (irqnum
irqnum
irqnum
irqnum
{
printk
return
}

!=
!=
!=
!=

INT_CPU0
INT_CPU1
INT_CPU2
INT_CPU3

&&
&&
&&
)

("IRQ number was different from expected.\n");
IRQ_NONE;

disable_pmu();
//printk(KERN_INFO "IRQ on core %u\tIRQ Number is %u\n",
smp_processor_id(), infoStruct->irqnum);
flags = read_flags();
if (flags == 0)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "Possible interrupt error on core %u. IRQ Num:
%u\tFlags: 0x%x", smp_processor_id(), irqnum, flags);
return IRQ_NONE;
}
gatherSample();
reset_pmn();
if (shutdown == 0)
{
write_ccnt(0xFFFFFFFF - period);
}
// Reset overflow flags
write_flags(0xFFFFFFFF);
if (shutdown == 0)
{
enable_pmu();
}
return IRQ_HANDLED;
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}
// Configures PMU cycle count interrupts for all CPU cores.
static int config_irq(void)
{
unsigned long irq_flags;
int rc;
irq_flags = IRQF_NOBALANCING;
rc = request_irq(INT_CPU0, sample_handle_irq, irq_flags,
"pmu_sync0", NULL);
if (rc)
{
return rc;
}
rc = request_irq(INT_CPU1, sample_handle_irq, irq_flags,
"pmu_sync1", NULL);
if (rc)
{
free_irq(INT_CPU0, NULL);
return rc;
}
rc = request_irq(INT_CPU2, sample_handle_irq, irq_flags,
"pmu_sync2", NULL);
if (rc)
{
free_irq(INT_CPU0, NULL);
free_irq(INT_CPU1, NULL);
return rc;
}
rc = request_irq(INT_CPU3, sample_handle_irq, irq_flags,
"pmu_sync3", NULL);
if (rc)
{
free_irq(INT_CPU0, NULL);
free_irq(INT_CPU1, NULL);
free_irq(INT_CPU2, NULL);
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
// CPU Online / Offline Handlers
// These methods enabled /disable PMU sample gathering for a CPU
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// based on if the CPU is online or offline
// Reference: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cpu-hotplug.txt
void registerCpuOnlineCallback(callback ptrCallback)
{
cpuOnlineCallback = ptrCallback;
}
void onCpuOnline(void *info)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "PMU Sampler: CPU online\n");
startCtrsLocal();
}
void onCpuOffline(void *info)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "PMU Sampler: CPU offline\n");
stopCtrsLocal(NULL);
}
// Called when a CPU comes online / goes offline
int cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu;
printk(KERN_INFO "CPU Change on CPU %u\n", cpu);
// Wait until PMU values have been set. Otherwise the module will
crash.
if (shutdown == 0 && eventConfigs[0] > 0)
{
switch (action)
{
case CPU_ONLINE:
case CPU_ONLINE_FROZEN:
printk(KERN_INFO "CPU %u Online \n", cpu);
smp_call_function_single(cpu, onCpuOnline, NULL, 1);
break;
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE_FROZEN:
printk(KERN_INFO "CPU %u Going Down \n", cpu);
smp_call_function_single(cpu, onCpuOffline, NULL, 1);
break;
}
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
static struct notifier_block cpu_notifier =
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{
.notifier_call = cpu_callback,
};
// No-ops
void register_interrupt(void) { }
void deregister_interrupt(void) { }
void stopCtrsLocal(void* d)
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned int proc = smp_processor_id();
disable_ccnt_irq();
disable_ccnt();
for (i = 0; i < num_ctrs; i++)
{
disable_pmn(i);
}
disable_pmu();
printk(KERN_INFO "Disabled PMU on core %u\n", proc);
}
void startCtrsLocal(void)
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned int proc = smp_processor_id();
printk(KERN_INFO "PMU Sampler: Configuring PMU on core %u\n", proc);
if (init_pmu_single(proc))
{
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to set IRQ affinity for PMU interrupt for
CPU %u!\n", proc);
}
disable_pmu();
disable_ccnt();
reset_ccnt();
reset_pmn();
// Reset overflow flags
write_flags(0xFFFFFFFF);
// Overflow once every ’period’ cycles
write_ccnt(0xFFFFFFFF - period);
for (i=0; i<num_ctrs; i++) {
pmn_config(i, eventConfigs[i]);
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}
dump_regs();
enable_ccnt_irq();
for (i = 0; i < num_ctrs; i++)
{
enable_pmn(i);
}
enable_ccnt();
enable_pmu();
}
int initialize_arch(void)
{
int rc;
rc = 0;
if (rc)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to set IRQ affinity for PMU interrupts!\n");
return -1;
}
num_ctrs = getPMN();
printk(KERN_INFO " Found %lu counters", num_ctrs);
printk(KERN_INFO " Configuring interrupt handler");
rc = config_irq();
if (rc)
{
printk(KERN_ERR " -> Error configuring interrupts (%d)!!!", rc);
return -1;
}
printk(KERN_INFO " Registering CPU notifier\n");
register_hotcpu_notifier(&cpu_notifier);
return 0;
}
void cleanup_arch(void)
{
unregister_hotcpu_notifier(&cpu_notifier);
free_irq(INT_CPU0, NULL);
free_irq(INT_CPU1, NULL);
free_irq(INT_CPU2, NULL);
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free_irq(INT_CPU3, NULL);
}

Code A.2: Sample and Buffer Structs
/*
* Sample and buffer structures in which PMU samples are stored.
*/
#define BUFFER_SIZE (4*1024)
struct sample {
unsigned long cycles; // Cycle count in which the sample was taken
unsigned long pid; // Process ID of the currently running process
unsigned int counters[6]; // PMU sample values
};
#define BUFFER_ENTRIES ((BUFFER_SIZE - 12) / sizeof(struct sample))
struct buffer {
unsigned int core;
unsigned int num_samples;
struct buffer *nextBuffer; // For linked list purposes
struct sample samples[BUFFER_ENTRIES];
};

A.2

PMU Samples Parser Code

This section contains relevant source code from the PMU Samples Parser
application.
Code A.3: Parser Class
public enum FeatureVectorType
{
[Description("1.) Raw samples")]
RawSamples = 1,
[Description("2.) Sum values between context switch")]
SummedContextSwitch = 2,
[Description("3.) Average values between context switch")]
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AverageContextSwitch = 3,
[Description("4.) Summed values between context switch with additional
dimension for total samples")]
SummedContextSwitchWithTotalCountIncluded = 4,
[Description("5.) Average values between context switch with
additional dimension for total samples")]
AverageContextSwithWithTotalCountIncluded = 5,
[Description("6.) Histograms without regard to context switches")]
Histogram = 6,
[Description("7.) Histograms between context switches")]
HistogramBetweenContextSwitches = 7
}
// Parses through raw PMU event files and creates a dataset
public class Parser
{
private StreamWriter datasetWriter;
private FeatureVectorType aggregateType;
private readonly ISampleAggregator sampleAggregator;
private long sampleFileIdCounter = 0;
public Parser(ISampleAggregator sampleAggregatorArg)
{
sampleAggregator = sampleAggregatorArg;
}
private void WriteToDataSet(string lineToWrite)
{
lock (datasetWriter)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine(lineToWrite);
}
}
private void WriteToDataSet(List<string> linesToWrite)
{
lock (datasetWriter)
{
foreach (string line in linesToWrite)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine(linesToWrite);
}
}
}
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private string GenerateOutputFileName(FeatureVectorType
aggregateTypeArg, bool includeProcessInfo, bool isTestSet)
{
string rv = null;
string testType = (isTestSet) ? "test" : "train";
string procinfoString = (includeProcessInfo) ? "procInfo_" : "";
string histogramInformation = "";
if (aggregateTypeArg ==
FeatureVectorType.HistogramBetweenContextSwitches)
{
histogramInformation = "_CtxSwitch";
}
else if (aggregateTypeArg == FeatureVectorType.Histogram)
{
histogramInformation = "_IgnoreCtxSwitch";
}
rv = string.Format("{0}_{1}dataset_{2}{3}.arff", testType,
procinfoString, aggregateType.ToString(), histogramInformation);
return rv;
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a dataset file that logs the summed values of a sample
file.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="outputDirectory">Directory where the dataset file
will be saved.</param>
public void CreateDatasetFile(
string outputDirectory,
FeatureVectorType aggregateTypeArg,
bool includeProcessInfo,
int experimentNum,
bool isTestSet)
{
if (datasetWriter != null)
{
datasetWriter.Close();
datasetWriter.Dispose();
datasetWriter = null;
sampleFileIdCounter = 0;
}
aggregateType = aggregateTypeArg;
string outputFileName = GenerateOutputFileName(aggregateType,
includeProcessInfo, isTestSet);

128

string outputFile = Path.Combine(outputDirectory, outputFileName);
try
{
FileStream stream = new FileStream(outputFile, FileMode.Append);
datasetWriter = new StreamWriter(stream);
if (stream.Position == 0)
{
// We are creating a new file, so format the top of the file
into an ARFF format
if (aggregateType == FeatureVectorType.Histogram ||
aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.HistogramBetweenContextSwitches)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine("@RELATION " + "Experiment_" +
experimentNum + "_" + outputFileName);
WriteHistogramAttributes();
}
else
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine("@RELATION " + outputFileName);
WritePmuAttributeInformation(experimentNum);
}
if (aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.AverageContextSwithWithTotalCountIncluded
||
aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.SummedContextSwitchWithTotalCountIncluded)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine("@ATTRIBUTE
ValBetweenContextSwitch real");
}
if (includeProcessInfo)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine("@ATTRIBUTE Process_Name
string");
datasetWriter.WriteLine("@ATTRIBUTE Sample_File_ID
real");
}
datasetWriter.WriteLine(
string.Format("@ATTRIBUTE class {{{0},{1}}}",
Constants.MalwareString,
Constants.NonMalwareString));
datasetWriter.WriteLine("");
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datasetWriter.WriteLine("@DATA");
}
sampleAggregator.DataAggregatedEvent += WriteToDataSet;
sampleAggregator.MultipleDataAggregatedEvent += WriteToDataSet;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Console.WriteLine("Unable to create dataset output file.
Exception: " + ex.Message);
}
}
private void WriteHistogramAttributes()
{
const string EventText = "Event_";
for (int i = 1; i <= 6; i++)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine(string.Format("@ATTRIBUTE
{0}{1}_BinSize real", EventText, i));
datasetWriter.WriteLine(string.Format("@ATTRIBUTE {0}{1}_Min
real", EventText, i));
datasetWriter.WriteLine(string.Format("@ATTRIBUTE {0}{1}_Max
real", EventText, i));
for (int k = 1; k <= Constants.BucketCountHistogram; k++)
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine(string.Format("@ATTRIBUTE
{0}{1}_Bin_{2} real", EventText, i, k));
}
}
}
// Writes pmu event information to the ARFF file based on the
experiment number
private void WritePmuAttributeInformation(int experimentNumber)
{
// ... Method details not shown
}
/// <summary>
/// Closes the dataset writer stream.
/// </summary>
public void CloseDataSetFile()
{
if (datasetWriter != null)
{
datasetWriter.Flush();
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datasetWriter.Close();
datasetWriter.Dispose();
sampleAggregator.DataAggregatedEvent -= WriteToDataSet;
sampleAggregator.MultipleDataAggregatedEvent -= WriteToDataSet;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Parses a sample file and writes its’ output to a CSV file of the
same file name.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="fileName">File name (includes file path) of the file
to parse.</param>
/// <param name="outputDirectory">Directory where the CSV file will be
saved.</param>
/// <param name="createCsvFile">Specifies whether or not to create a
CSV file with the values parsed.</param>
/// <param name="includeProcessInfo">Include process info and sample
file ID in the dataset for each vector.</param>
public void ParseSampleFile(string fileName, string outputDirectory,
bool createCsvFile = true, bool includeProcessInfo = false)
{
List<Sample> samples = new List<Sample>();
using (BinaryReader reader = new BinaryReader(File.Open(fileName,
FileMode.Open), Encoding.ASCII))
{
// There exists three C-style strings at the beginning of each
file
string s1 = ReadCString(reader);
string processName = ReadCString(reader);
string s3 = ReadCString(reader);
long threadId = GetThreadId();
// Position and length variables
int pos = s1.Length + processName.Length + s3.Length;
int length = (int)reader.BaseStream.Length;
while (pos < length)
{
Sample sample = new Sample();
sample.CycleCount = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.EventValue1 = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.EventValue2 = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.EventValue3 = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.EventValue4 = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.EventValue5 = reader.ReadUInt32();
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sample.EventValue6 = reader.ReadUInt32();
sample.ProcessName = processName.TrimEnd(’\0’);
sample.SampleFileId = threadId;
string fileNameOnly = Path.GetFileName(fileName);
sample.FromMalware =
fileNameOnly.Contains(Constants.MalwareString);
pos += sizeof(uint) * 7;
samples.Add(sample);
}
}
// If there does not exist a context switch sample at the end of
the list, add one so the dataset aggregation
// methods behave as expected.
if (!samples.Last().IsContextSwitch())
{
samples.Add(new Sample());
}
if (datasetWriter != null)
{
sampleAggregator.AggregateData(samples, aggregateType,
includeProcessInfo);
}
if (createCsvFile)
{
string newFileNameWithOldPath = Path.ChangeExtension(fileName,
".csv");
string newFilePath = Path.Combine(outputDirectory,
Path.GetFileName(newFileNameWithOldPath));
OutputToCsvFile(newFilePath, samples);
}
}
private long GetThreadId()
{
return Interlocked.Increment(ref sampleFileIdCounter);
}
private string ReadCString(BinaryReader reader)
{
List<char> charlist = new List<char>();
char c;
do
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{
c = reader.ReadChar();
charlist.Add(c);
} while (c != ’\0’);
string rv = new string(charlist.ToArray());
return rv;
}
}

Code A.4: SampleAggregator Class
/// <summary>
/// Contains various methods to aggregate samples.
/// </summary>
public class SampleAggregator : ISampleAggregator
{
private const string UnknownProcessString = "Unknown";
public event Action<string> DataAggregatedEvent;
public event Action<List<string>> MultipleDataAggregatedEvent;
public void AggregateData(List<Sample> samples,
FeatureVectorType aggregateType,
bool includeProcessInfo = false)
{
if (aggregateType == FeatureVectorType.SummedContextSwitch)
{
SumSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(samples, false,
includeProcessInfo);
}
else if (aggregateType == FeatureVectorType.AverageContextSwitch)
{
AverageSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(samples, false,
includeProcessInfo);
}
else if (aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.SummedContextSwitchWithTotalCountIncluded)
{
SumSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(samples, true,
includeProcessInfo);
}
else if (aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.AverageContextSwithWithTotalCountIncluded)
{
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AverageSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(samples, true,
includeProcessInfo);
}
else if (aggregateType == FeatureVectorType.Histogram)
{
CreateHistogramFromSamples(samples, includeProcessInfo, false);
}
else if (aggregateType ==
FeatureVectorType.HistogramBetweenContextSwitches)
{
CreateHistogramFromSamples(samples, includeProcessInfo, true);
}
else if (aggregateType == FeatureVectorType.RawSamples)
{
List<string> sampleStrings = new List<string>();
foreach (Sample sample in samples)
{
string malwareString = (sample.FromMalware) ?
Constants.MalwareString : Constants.NonMalwareString;
string sampleString =
sample.CycleCount + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue1 + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue2 + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue3 + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue4 + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue5 + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.EventValue6 + Constants.Delimiter +
malwareString;
sampleStrings.Add(sampleString);
}
if (MultipleDataAggregatedEvent != null)
{
MultipleDataAggregatedEvent(sampleStrings);
}
}
}
private void CreateHistograms(List<Sample> samples, bool
includeProcessInfo)
{
int buckets = Constants.BucketCountHistogram;
List<uint> event1 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
List<uint> event2 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
List<uint> event3 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
List<uint> event4 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
List<uint> event5 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
List<uint> event6 = new List<uint>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
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foreach (var sample in samples)
{
event1.Add(sample.EventValue1);
event2.Add(sample.EventValue2);
event3.Add(sample.EventValue3);
event4.Add(sample.EventValue4);
event5.Add(sample.EventValue5);
event6.Add(sample.EventValue6);
}
var
var
var
var
var
var

binnedEvents1
binnedEvents2
binnedEvents3
binnedEvents4
binnedEvents5
binnedEvents6

=
=
=
=
=
=

new
new
new
new
new
new

Histogram(event1,
Histogram(event2,
Histogram(event3,
Histogram(event4,
Histogram(event5,
Histogram(event6,

buckets);
buckets);
buckets);
buckets);
buckets);
buckets);

// Write the bins as a single feature vector
List<Histogram> histoList = new List<Histogram>()
{
binnedEvents1, binnedEvents2, binnedEvents3,
binnedEvents4, binnedEvents5, binnedEvents6
};
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
foreach (var histogram in histoList)
{
builder.Append(histogram.ToString());
}
string lineToAppend = builder.ToString();
if (includeProcessInfo)
{
string procName =
(!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(samples[0].ProcessName)) ?
samples[0].ProcessName : UnknownProcessString;
lineToAppend += procName + Constants.Delimiter +
samples[0].SampleFileId + Constants.Delimiter;
}
string malwareString = (samples[0].FromMalware) ?
Constants.MalwareString : Constants.NonMalwareString;
lineToAppend += malwareString;
if (DataAggregatedEvent != null)
{
DataAggregatedEvent(lineToAppend);
}
}
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private void CreateHistogramFromSamples(List<Sample> samples, bool
includeProcessInfo, bool createHistogramBetweenContextSwitches =
false)
{
List<Sample> samplesToProcess = new
List<Sample>(Constants.SamplesToRead);
// Read samples into list, keep processing until context switch
encountered or end of samples list
int counter = 0;
while (counter < samples.Count)
{
// if context switch encountered and
createHistogramBetweenContextSwitches is true
// start over on the samples to process list
if (samples[counter].IsContextSwitch())
{
if (createHistogramBetweenContextSwitches)
{
samplesToProcess.Clear();
}
}
else
{
samplesToProcess.Add(samples[counter]);
}
if (samplesToProcess.Count == Constants.SamplesToRead)
{
// process samples
CreateHistograms(samplesToProcess, includeProcessInfo);
samplesToProcess.Clear();
}
counter++;
}
}
#region PMU Sample Aggregation Methods
/// <summary>
/// Given a samples list, sums the vectors between context switches
and writes it to the dataset.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="samples">Samples list gathered from a single sample
file</param>
/// <param name="addSampleCountDimension">Adds another dimension to
the vector that is written to the dataset.
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/// This dimension is the number of samples that were logged between
context switches.</param>
private void SumSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(List<Sample> samples,
bool addSampleCountDimension, bool includeProcessInfo = false)
{
ulong event1Sum = 0;
ulong event2Sum = 0;
ulong event3Sum = 0;
ulong event4Sum = 0;
ulong event5Sum = 0;
ulong event6Sum = 0;
ulong sampleCounter = 0;
foreach (Sample sample in samples)
{
if (sample.IsContextSwitch())
{
// sum values until context switch detected
// when switch detected, log values to dataset file and
reset counters
string malwareString = (sample.FromMalware) ?
Constants.MalwareString : Constants.NonMalwareString;
string lineToAppend =
event1Sum + Constants.Delimiter +
event2Sum + Constants.Delimiter +
event3Sum + Constants.Delimiter +
event4Sum + Constants.Delimiter +
event5Sum + Constants.Delimiter +
event6Sum + Constants.Delimiter;
if (addSampleCountDimension)
{
lineToAppend += sampleCounter.ToString() +
Constants.Delimiter;
}
if (includeProcessInfo)
{
string procName =
(!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sample.ProcessName)) ?
sample.ProcessName : UnknownProcessString;
lineToAppend += procName + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.SampleFileId + Constants.Delimiter;
}
lineToAppend += malwareString;
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if (DataAggregatedEvent != null &&
!lineToAppend.Contains("0,0,0,0,0,0,"))
{
DataAggregatedEvent(lineToAppend);
}
event1Sum = 0;
event2Sum = 0;
event3Sum = 0;
event4Sum = 0;
event5Sum = 0;
event6Sum = 0;
sampleCounter = 0;
}
else
{
event1Sum += sample.EventValue1;
event2Sum += sample.EventValue2;
event3Sum += sample.EventValue3;
event4Sum += sample.EventValue4;
event5Sum += sample.EventValue5;
event6Sum += sample.EventValue6;
sampleCounter++;
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Given a samples list, averages the vectors between context
switches and writes it to the dataset.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="samples">Samples list gathered from a single sample
file</param>
/// <param name="addSampleCountDimension">Adds another dimension to
the vector that is written to the dataset.
/// This dimension is the number of samples that were logged between
context switches.</param>
private void AverageSamplesBetweenContextSwitches(List<Sample>
samples, bool addSampleCountDimension, bool includeProcessInfo =
false)
{
ulong event1Sum = 0;
ulong event2Sum = 0;
ulong event3Sum = 0;
ulong event4Sum = 0;
ulong event5Sum = 0;
ulong event6Sum = 0;
ulong sampleCounter = 0;
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foreach (Sample sample in samples)
{
if (sample.IsContextSwitch())
{
if (sampleCounter == 0)
{
continue;
}
// sum values until context switch detected, then find
average
// when switch detected, log values to dataset file and
reset counters
ulong event1Average = event1Sum / sampleCounter;
ulong event2Average = event2Sum / sampleCounter;
ulong event3Average = event3Sum / sampleCounter;
ulong event4Average = event4Sum / sampleCounter;
ulong event5Average = event5Sum / sampleCounter;
ulong event6Average = event6Sum / sampleCounter;
string malwareString = (sample.FromMalware) ?
Constants.MalwareString : Constants.NonMalwareString;
string lineToAppend =
event1Average +
event2Average +
event3Average +
event4Average +
event5Average +
event6Average +

Constants.Delimiter +
Constants.Delimiter +
Constants.Delimiter +
Constants.Delimiter +
Constants.Delimiter +
Constants.Delimiter;

if (addSampleCountDimension)
{
lineToAppend += sampleCounter.ToString() +
Constants.Delimiter;
}
if (includeProcessInfo)
{
string procName =
(!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sample.ProcessName)) ?
sample.ProcessName : UnknownProcessString;
lineToAppend += procName + Constants.Delimiter +
sample.SampleFileId + Constants.Delimiter;
}
lineToAppend += malwareString;
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if (DataAggregatedEvent != null)
{
DataAggregatedEvent(lineToAppend);
}
event1Sum = 0;
event2Sum = 0;
event3Sum = 0;
event4Sum = 0;
event5Sum = 0;
event6Sum = 0;
sampleCounter = 0;
}
else
{
event1Sum += sample.EventValue1;
event2Sum += sample.EventValue2;
event3Sum += sample.EventValue3;
event4Sum += sample.EventValue4;
event5Sum += sample.EventValue5;
event6Sum += sample.EventValue6;
sampleCounter++;
}
}
}
#endregion
}

Code A.5: Other Classes
/// <summary>
/// Represents a PMU feature vector.
/// </summary>
[Serializable]
public class Sample
{
public uint CycleCount = 0;
public uint EventValue1 = 0;
public uint EventValue2 = 0;
public uint EventValue3 = 0;
public uint EventValue4 = 0;
public uint EventValue5 = 0;
public uint EventValue6 = 0;
/// <summary>
/// Specifies if this sample came from a malware application
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/// or a non-malware application.
/// </summary>
public bool FromMalware;
/// <summary>
/// The sample file ID from which this vector originated.
/// </summary>
public long SampleFileId;
/// <summary>
/// The process name from which this vector originated.
/// </summary>
public string ProcessName;
/// <summary>
/// Returns whether or not this sample is a context switch (all values
are zero).
/// </summary>
/// <returns>True if sample is context switch</returns>
public bool IsContextSwitch()
{
return (CycleCount == 0 &&
EventValue1 == 0 &&
EventValue2 == 0 &&
EventValue3 == 0 &&
EventValue4 == 0 &&
EventValue5 == 0 &&
EventValue6 == 0);
}
}

/// <summary>
/// Represents a histogram.
/// </summary>
public class Histogram
{
private readonly List<uint> bins;
public List<uint> Bins
{
get { return bins; }
}
public
public
public
public

uint Min { get; private set; }
uint Max { get; private set; }
int TotalBins { get; private set; }
uint BinSize { get; private set; }

public Histogram(List<uint> items, int binsArg)
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{
TotalBins = binsArg;

// Performs binning. Reference:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2387916/looking-for-a-histogram-binning-alg
Min = items.Min();
Max = items.Max();
bins = new List<uint>(TotalBins);
for (int i = 0; i < TotalBins; i++)
{
bins.Add(0);
}
BinSize = (Max - Min) / (uint)TotalBins;
foreach (var value in items)
{
int bucketIndex = 0;
if (BinSize > 0.0)
{
bucketIndex = (int)((value - Min) / BinSize);
if (bucketIndex >= TotalBins)
{
bucketIndex = TotalBins - 1;
}
}
bins[bucketIndex]++;
}
}
public override string ToString()
{
string rv =
BinSize.ToString() + Constants.Delimiter +
Min.ToString() + Constants.Delimiter +
Max.ToString() + Constants.Delimiter;
foreach (uint count in bins)
{
rv += count.ToString() + Constants.Delimiter;
}
return rv;
}
}
// Contains constants used throughout the application.
public class Constants
{
public const string MalwareString = "malware";
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public
public
public
public

const
const
const
const

string NonMalwareString = "non_malware";
string Delimiter = ",";
int BucketCountHistogram = 8;
int SamplesToRead = 32;

}

/// <summary>
/// Parses the binary samples files in the format of the "Android Malware
/// Performance Counter" data set from Columbia University.
/// Link: http://castl.cs.columbia.edu/colmalset/
/// </summary>
class Program
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
Parser parser = new Parser(new SampleAggregator());
if (args.Length < 4)
{
Console.WriteLine("Invalid arguments.");
Console.WriteLine("Example: ./SampleParser <samples directory>
<output directory> <Experiment Number (1-N)> <aggregation
method> ’-includeProcInfo[optional]’ \n");
Console.WriteLine("Aggregation value choices:");
var choices = parser.GetFeatureVectorDescriptions();
foreach (string choice in choices)
{
Console.WriteLine(choice);
}
return;
}
string samplesDir = args[0];
string outputDir = args[1];
string experimentNumString = args[2];
FeatureVectorType aggregationType =
FeatureVectorType.SummedContextSwitch;
if (args.Length >= 4 && !Enum.TryParse<FeatureVectorType>(args[3],
out aggregationType))
{
Console.WriteLine("Error: Invalid aggregation method choice.
Using default.");
}
int experimentNumber = 0;
if (!int.TryParse(experimentNumString, out experimentNumber))
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{
Console.WriteLine("Error: Experiment number argument is not a
number.");
return;
}
bool includeProcessInfo = false;
if (args.Length >= 5 && args[4].ToLower().Contains("-include"))
{
includeProcessInfo = true;
}
bool isTestSet = samplesDir.ToLower().Contains("test");
parser.CreateDatasetFile(outputDir, aggregationType,
includeProcessInfo, experimentNumber, isTestSet);
// Do pattern matching and build up list of files to parse
var filesToParse = GetFilesToParse(samplesDir, "*.*");
Console.WriteLine("\nParsing {0} Files...", filesToParse.Count);
Parallel.ForEach(filesToParse, fileName =>
{
parser.ParseSampleFile(fileName, outputDir, false,
includeProcessInfo);
});
parser.CloseDataSetFile();
Console.WriteLine("Parsing complete.");
}
private static List<string> GetFilesToParse(string samplesDir, string
pattern)
{
List<string> rv = null;
try
{
rv = new List<string>(Directory.GetFiles(samplesDir, pattern,
SearchOption.TopDirectoryOnly));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Console.WriteLine("Unable to retrieve files list to parse.
Exception: {0}", ex.Message);
rv = new List<string>();
}
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return rv;
}
}

A.3

Thread Classifier Code

This section contains relevant source code from the Thread Classifer application.
Code A.6: DatasetParser Class
public class DatasetParser
{
/// <summary>
/// Maps thread ID to a thread results object.
/// </summary>
private readonly Dictionary<int, IThreadResults> threadResultsMap =
new Dictionary<int, IThreadResults>();
public void ParseDataset(string testDatasetFile, string
outputFileName, string familyMapFileName)
{
bool usingThreadResultsEnhanced = false;
using (var datasetReader = new StreamReader(testDatasetFile))
{
// skip past inital items in ARFF file
int count = 0;
string dummy;
while ((dummy = datasetReader.ReadLine()) != "@data")
{
if (count > 100)
{
// data string not found, exit out of loop, file is bad
break;
}
count++;
}
while (!datasetReader.EndOfStream)
{
double predictedMalware, predictedNonMalware;
var splits = datasetReader.ReadLine().Split(’,’);
if (splits.Length == 10)
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{ // 6 PMU events, process name, thread ID, correct label,
predicted label
string processName = splits[6];
string threadIdString = splits[7];
string correctLabel = splits[8];
string predictedLabel = splits[9];
int threadId;
if (int.TryParse(threadIdString, out threadId))
{
if (threadResultsMap.ContainsKey(threadId))
{
// Add context switch info to existing thread
object
threadResultsMap[threadId].AddPredictionInfo(correctLabel,
predictedLabel);
}
else
{
// Add new thread info object, then add context
switch info
bool isMalware = Equals(correctLabel,
Constants.MalwareString);
ThreadResults results = new
ThreadResults(threadId, processName,
isMalware);
results.AddPredictionInfo(correctLabel,
predictedLabel);
threadResultsMap.Add(threadId, results);
}
}
}
else if (splits.Length >= 12 &&
double.TryParse(splits[splits.Length - 2], out
predictedMalware) &&
double.TryParse(splits[splits.Length - 1], out
predictedNonMalware))
{ // We have a histogram
usingThreadResultsEnhanced = true;
string
string
string
string

processName = splits[splits.Length - 6];
threadIdString = splits[splits.Length - 5];
correctLabel = splits[splits.Length - 4];
predictedLabel = splits[splits.Length - 3];

int threadId;
if (int.TryParse(threadIdString, out threadId))
{
if (threadResultsMap.ContainsKey(threadId))
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{
// Add context switch info to existing thread
object
threadResultsMap[threadId].AddPredictionInfo(
correctLabel, predictedLabel,
predictedMalware, predictedNonMalware);
}
else
{
// Add new thread info object, then add context
switch info
bool isMalware = Equals(correctLabel,
Constants.MalwareString);
ThreadResultsEnhanced results = new
ThreadResultsEnhanced(
threadId, processName, isMalware);
results.AddPredictionInfo(
correctLabel, predictedLabel,
predictedMalware, predictedNonMalware);
threadResultsMap.Add(threadId, results);
}
}
}
else
{
Console.WriteLine("Warning: Encountered line in dataset
file that does not contain the correct amount of
attributes and labels.");
}
}
}
// Done reading dataset file, now perform writing information to CSV
if (usingThreadResultsEnhanced)
{
CreateOutputCsvFileForThreadResultsEnhanced(outputFileName);
}
else
{
CreateOutputCsvFileForThreadResults(outputFileName);
}
CreateMalwareFamilyOutputCsvFile(outputFileName, familyMapFileName);
}

private void CreateOutputCsvFileForThreadResultsEnhanced(string
fileName)
{
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try
{
int correctlyIdentifiedMalwareThreads = 0;
int incorrectMalwareCount = 0;
int incorrectNonMalwareCount = 0;
int correctNonMalwareCount = 0;
using (var datasetWriter = new StreamWriter(fileName))
{
// Write column names
datasetWriter.WriteLine(
"Thread ID" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Process Name" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Is Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Total Predictions" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Highest Predicted Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Highest Predicted Non-Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Times Classified as Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Times Classified as Non-Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Predicted Malware Average" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Predicted Non-Malware Average" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Classified As Malware?"
);
foreach (var result in
threadResultsMap.Values.OfType<ThreadResultsEnhanced>())
{
datasetWriter.WriteLine(
result.ThreadId + Constants.Delimiter +
result.ProcessName + Constants.Delimiter +
result.IsMalware + Constants.Delimiter +
result.TotalPredictions + Constants.Delimiter +
result.HighestMalwarePrediction +
Constants.Delimiter +
result.HighestNonMalwarePrediction +
Constants.Delimiter +
result.PredictedMalwareCount + Constants.Delimiter +
result.PredictedNonMalwareCount +
Constants.Delimiter +
result.PredictedMalwareAverage + Constants.Delimiter
+
result.PredictedNonMalwareAverage +
Constants.Delimiter +
result.IsClassifiedAsMalware()
);
if (result.TotalPredictions > 10)
{
if (result.IsMalware)
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{
if (result.IsClassifiedAsMalware())
{
correctlyIdentifiedMalwareThreads++;
}
else
{
incorrectMalwareCount++;
}
}
else // Handle false positive count
{
if (result.IsClassifiedAsMalware())
{
incorrectNonMalwareCount++;
}
else
{
correctNonMalwareCount++;
}
}
}
}
}
int totalCount = correctlyIdentifiedMalwareThreads +
incorrectMalwareCount;
double correctPercentage =
((double)correctlyIdentifiedMalwareThreads /
(double)totalCount) * 100;
Console.WriteLine("Correctly identifed malware threads: {0}
({1}%)", correctlyIdentifiedMalwareThreads,
correctPercentage);
double incorrectPercentage = ((double)incorrectMalwareCount /
(double)totalCount) * 100;
Console.WriteLine("Incorrectly identifed malware threads: {0}
({1}%)", incorrectMalwareCount, incorrectPercentage);
int totalNonMalwareCount = correctNonMalwareCount +
incorrectNonMalwareCount;
double correctPercentageNonMalware =
((double)correctNonMalwareCount /
(double)totalNonMalwareCount) * 100;
Console.WriteLine("Correctly identifed non-malware threads: {0}
({1}%)", correctNonMalwareCount,
correctPercentageNonMalware);
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double incorrectPercentageNonMalware =
((double)incorrectNonMalwareCount /
(double)totalNonMalwareCount) * 100;
Console.WriteLine("Incorrectly identifed non-malware threads:
{0} ({1}%)", incorrectNonMalwareCount,
incorrectPercentageNonMalware);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Console.WriteLine("Unable to create CSV output file. Exception:
" + ex.Message);
}
}
private void CreateOutputCsvFileForThreadResults(string fileName)
{
// Method details not shown. Similar to method above.
}
private List<MalwareFamilyInfo> BuildFamilyInfoList(string
malwareFamilyMapFileName)
{
Dictionary<string, MalwareFamilyInfo> rv = new
Dictionary<string,MalwareFamilyInfo>();
MalwareFamilyMap familyMap = new
MalwareFamilyMap(malwareFamilyMapFileName);
List<string> unmappedProcesses = new List<string>();
foreach (var result in threadResultsMap.Values)
{
// We only care about malware apps for this
if (result.IsMalware)
{
string familyName =
familyMap.GetAssociatedMalwareFamilyName(result.ProcessName);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(familyName))
{
if (rv.ContainsKey(familyName))
{
rv[familyName].AddThread(result);
}
else
{
MalwareFamilyInfo newInfo = new
MalwareFamilyInfo(familyName);
newInfo.AddThread(result);
rv.Add(familyName, newInfo);
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}
}
else
{
unmappedProcesses.Add(result.ProcessName);
}
}
}
if (unmappedProcesses.Count > 0)
{
Console.WriteLine("Warning: Found the following unmapped
process names:");
foreach (string name in unmappedProcesses.Distinct())
{
Console.WriteLine(name);
}
Console.WriteLine("\n");
}
return rv.Values.ToList();
}
private void CreateMalwareFamilyOutputCsvFile(string fileName, string
familyMapFileName)
{
try
{
string directory = Path.GetDirectoryName(fileName);
string fileNameOnly = Path.GetFileName(fileName);
string outputFileName = Path.Combine(directory,
"malware_families_" + fileNameOnly);
using (var datasetWriter = new StreamWriter(outputFileName))
{
// Write column names
datasetWriter.WriteLine(
"Malware Family" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Total Testing Threads" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Threads Classifies As Malware" + Constants.Delimiter +
"Classification Percentage"
);
double averagePercentSum = 0;
var infoList = BuildFamilyInfoList(familyMapFileName);
foreach (var info in infoList)
{
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datasetWriter.WriteLine(
info.Family + Constants.Delimiter +
info.TotalThreads + Constants.Delimiter +
info.ThreadsClassifiedAsMalware +
Constants.Delimiter +
info.ClassificationPercent
);
averagePercentSum += info.ClassificationPercent;
}
double averagePercent = averagePercentSum /
(double)infoList.Count;
Console.WriteLine("Malware Family Average Percentage: {0}",
averagePercent);
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Console.WriteLine("Unable to create malware family CSV output
file. Exception: " + ex.Message);
}
}

Code A.7: MalwareFamilyInfo and MalwareFamilyMap Class
// Specifies information about a malware family
public class MalwareFamilyInfo
{
public string Family { get; private set; }
public int TotalThreads { get; private set; }
public int ThreadsClassifiedAsMalware { get; private set; }
public double ClassificationPercent
{
get
{
double rv = (double)ThreadsClassifiedAsMalware /
(double)TotalThreads;
return rv * 100;
}
}
public MalwareFamilyInfo(string familyName)
{
Family = familyName;
}
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public void AddThread(IThreadResults results)
{
if (results.IsClassifiedAsMalware())
{
ThreadsClassifiedAsMalware++;
}
TotalThreads++;
}
}

// Maps a malware process name to a malware family name.
public class MalwareFamilyMap
{
private readonly Dictionary<string, string> processNameToFamilyMap =
new Dictionary<string, string>();
public MalwareFamilyMap(string filename)
{
ParseFile(filename);
}
private void ParseFile(string filename)
{
using (var rd = new StreamReader(filename))
{
while (!rd.EndOfStream)
{
var splits = rd.ReadLine().Split(’,’);
if (splits.Length == 2)
{
if (!processNameToFamilyMap.ContainsKey(splits[0]))
{
processNameToFamilyMap.Add(splits[0], splits[1]);
}
else
{
Console.WriteLine("Duplicate process name to malware
family mapping found. Key={0}\tValue={1}",
splits[0], splits[1]);
}
}
}
}
}
public string GetAssociatedMalwareFamilyName(string processName)
{
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string rv = null;
processNameToFamilyMap.TryGetValue(processName, out rv);
return rv;
}
public List<string> GetMalwareFamilyList()
{
return processNameToFamilyMap.Values.Distinct().ToList();
}
}

Code A.8: ThreadResultsEnhanced Class
// Contains information about a thread as it relates to classification.
public class ThreadResultsEnhanced : ThreadClassifier.IThreadResults
{
public ThreadResultsEnhanced(int threadId, string procName, bool
isMalware)
{
ThreadId = threadId;
ProcessName = procName;
IsMalware = isMalware;
}
public int ThreadId { get; private set; }
public string ProcessName { get; private set; }
public bool IsMalware { get; private set; }
private int totalPredictions;
public int TotalPredictions
{
get
{
return totalPredictions;
}
}
public double PredictedMalwareAverage
{
get
{
double average = predictedMalwareSum / (double)TotalPredictions;
return average;
}
}
public double PredictedNonMalwareAverage
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{
get
{
double average = predictedNonMalwareSum /
(double)TotalPredictions;
return average;
}
}
private double predictedMalwareSum;
private double predictedNonMalwareSum;
public int PredictedMalwareCount
{
get;
private set;
}
public int PredictedNonMalwareCount
{
get;
private set;
}
public void AddPredictionInfo(string correctLabel, string
predictedLabel,
double predictedMalware = -1.0d, double predictedNonMalware = -1.0d)
{
totalPredictions++;
// Aggregate (sum, then average the predicted values)
predictedMalwareSum += predictedMalware;
predictedNonMalwareSum += predictedNonMalware;
if (Equals(Constants.MalwareString, predictedLabel))
{
PredictedMalwareCount++;
}
else if (Equals(Constants.NonMalwareString, predictedLabel))
{
PredictedNonMalwareCount++;
}
else
{
Console.WriteLine("ERROR: Invalid class name encountered!");
}
}
// Returns true is thread is classified as malware, false otherwise.
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public bool IsClassifiedAsMalware()
{
bool isMalware;
if ((double)PredictedMalwareCount / (double)TotalPredictions >=
0.33)
{
isMalware = true;
}
else
{
isMalware = false;
}
return isMalware;
}
}
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APPENDIX B

ANDROID MALWARE FAMILY DESCRIPTIONS

This appendix lists the malware families that were used in the experiments as
well as descriptions of each malware family.

Table B.1: Malware Families

Name

Description

Android.Steek

Disguised as popular applications. Once opened the app directs the user to click a link to a website to unlock the app.
This website asks for personal information such as name, email, and phone number. [51]

Anserverbot

Command and control malware typically disguised as legitimate apps that are re-packaged and put on third-party Android app stores. [52]

CoinPirate

Re-packaged Coin Pirates app with malware payload. Monitors SMS messages and sends and receives information from
a server. [53]
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Table B.1: Malware Families

Name

Description

CruseWind

Trojan that can delete SMS text messages and send SMS text
messages to premium numbers. [54]

DroidDreamLight

Steals device information and uploads it to a server. [55]

DroidKungFu3

Attempts to gain root access and turn the phone into a remotely controlled bot. [56]

DroidKungFu4

Attempts to gain root access and turn the phone into a remotely controlled bot. This new iteration of the DroidKungFu
malware is more advanced that its predecessors. [57]

FakeAngry

Trojan horse that opens backdoor, downloads files, and steals
personal information. [58]

GoldDream

Trojan horse that steals information from the infected device.
Typically disguised as game software. [59]

Gone60

Steals personal information such as contact list and browsing
history in less than 1 minutes and uploads it to a server. This
data can be accessed from the server for a monetary fee. The
idea is to install the malware on another persons’ device to
steal their information and retrieve it at a later time. [60]

Jifake

Sends SMS text messages to premium numbers. [61]
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Table B.1: Malware Families

Name

Description

LoveTrap

Steals device identifier ID and sends SMS text messages to
premium numbers. [62]

Plankton

Retrieves malicious payload from a command and control
server. Malicious actions that could be taken are stealing
browser history, installing or removing home screen shortcuts,
and collecting runtime information. [63]

RogueSPPush

Attempts to sign up for premium SMS text services without
the users’ knowledge. [64]

YHZC

Also known as YZHC. Attempts to send SMS text messages
to a list of premium-rate numbers [65].

Zitmo

Disguised as a banking application. Listens to incoming SMS
text messages and forwards them to a remote server. This is
part of the Zeus Banking trojan and is mainly used to intercept mobile bank transaction authentication numbers (TAN).
[66]
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APPENDIX C

ARM CORTEX-A9 PMU EVENTS LIST

Table C.1: ARM Cortex PMU Events [5]

Event Number

Event Name

0x00

Software increment

0x01

Instruction cache misses

0x02

Instruction micro TLB misses

0x03

Data cache misses

0x04

Data cache accesses

0x05

Data micro TLB misses

0x06

Data reads

0x07

Data writes

0x08

Memory-reading instructions architecturally executed *

0x09

Exceptions taken

0x0A

Exception returns

0x0B

Write context ID
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Table C.1: ARM Cortex PMU Events [5]

Event Number

Event Name

0x0C

Software changes of the PC

0x0D

Immediate branches

0x0E

Procedure returns, other than exception return, architecturally executed *

0x0F

Unaligned load or stores

0x10

Branches mispredicted or not predicted

0x11

Cycle count

0x12

Predictable branches

* Event not supported for Cortex-A9.

Table C.2: ARM Cortex-A9 Specific PMU Events [5]

Event Number

Event Name

0x40

Java bytecodes execute

0x41

Software Java bytecodes executed

0x42

Jazelle backward branches executed

0x50

Coherent linefill misses

0x51

Coherent linefill hits
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Table C.2: ARM Cortex-A9 Specific PMU Events [5]

Event Number

Event Name

0x60

Instruction cache dependent stall cycles

0x61

Data cache dependent stall cycles

0x62

Main TLB miss stall cycles

0x63

STREX passed

0x64

STREX failed

0x65

Data evictions

0x66

Issue does not dispatch any instruction

0x67

Issue is empty

0x68

Instructions coming out of the core renaming stage

0x6E

Predictable function returns

0x70

Main execution unit instructions

0x71

Second execution unit instructions

0x72

Load/store instructions

0x73

Floating-point instructions

0x74

NEON instructions

0x80

Processor stalls because of PLDs

0x81

Processor stalled because of a write to memory

0x82

Processor stalled because of instruction side main TLB miss
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Table C.2: ARM Cortex-A9 Specific PMU Events [5]

Event Number

Event Name

0x83

Processor stalled because of data side main TLB miss

0x84

Processor stalled because of instruction micro TLB miss

0x85

Processor stalled because of data micro TLB miss

0x86

Processor stalled because of DMB

0x8A

Integer clock enabled

0x8B

Data Engine clock enabled

0x90

ISB instructions

0x91

DSB instructions

0x92

DMB instructions

0x93

External interrupts

0xA0

PLE cache line request completed

0xA1

PLE cache line request skipped

0xA2

PLE FIFO flush

0xA3

PLE request completed

0xA4

PLE FIFO overflow

0xA5

PLE request programmed
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